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Abstract 
Since wars have existed, there have been soldiers for hire.  As the state evolved, 
originating during the peace of Westphalia, and matured, the definition and the business 
of mercenarism have gone through many mutations. Today, and particularly since the 
1970s, mercenaries have banded together, incorporating themselves as private military 
firms, some of which are units of multinational corporations. Private Military 
Corporations (PMCs) offer expertise ranging from construction to logistics but a number 
of contractors have been accused of human rights violations, particularly in the current 
theatres of war in Iraq and Afghanistan. The theme of this thesis is that PMCs need to be 
regulated globally in order to prevent the prolongation of conflicts and the instability 
stemming from human rights violations.  In considering this theme, this thesis employs 
three case studies of civil wars in which PMCs were heavily involved.  It concludes that a 
variety of existing domestic, regional and international regulations can be expanded and 
strengthened in order to provide a robust regulative regime. 
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Chapter 1 
Rationale for Studying Private Military Contractors 
For approximately ten years, the United States and its allies have been waging 
very expensive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  In these theatres, there are over 200,000 
employees of Private Military Corporations (PMCs).  These are incorporated battalions of 
typically ex-military or law enforcement personnel who are contracted to fulfill the tasks 
normally done by a nation’s armed services or institutions.  With the rise of globalization, 
the PMCs have adopted many roles that used to be executed by a government or other 
private businesses.  Thousands of these freelancers can be found working domestically or 
abroad in areas such as Africa, Yemen and Pakistan. It has been estimated that PMCs are 
a $100 billion industry.1  Their services include logistics, intelligence gathering, 
weaponry training, border patrol, regional and global police instruction, as well as less 
glamorous duties such as construction.  They are equal opportunists as to their employers: 
clients include governments, insurgents, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), aid 
groups, such as animal conservationists and drug cartels.  Most PMCs are based in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Israel and Canada, but they have operated in most 
continents. 
The proliferation of these military corporations has also fostered numerous 
incidents in which they have been accused of criminal or overzealous acts that led to 
civilian deaths.  For example, they have been accused of sex trafficking in the United 
Nations’ (UN) operations in the Balkans.2  In Bosnia, a supervisor filmed himself raping 
                                                 
1 Barry Yoeman,“Soldiers of Good Fortune,” Mother Jones, May/ June 2003 issue. 
2 Tony Robson, “Bosnia: The United Nations, Human Trafficking and Prostitution,” 
August 12, 2002, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2002/aug2002/bosn-a21.shtml. 
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two women.3  In neither instance has anyone been prosecuted.  Instead the whistle 
blowers were fired.  Allegedly, PMCs were the ring leaders in breaching of the Geneva 
Conventions and the War Crimes Act of 1996 in the infamous Abu Ghraib detention 
center’s incidents of 2004.4  Furthermore, the PMCs stationed in Iraq have been accused 
of stealing from museums and banks.  Again the PMC employees were never brought to 
justice.5  On September 16, 2007, Blackwater employees killed 17, and injured more than 
20, Iraqi civilians in Nisour Square, Baghdad.  Although there was a civil suit in the 
United States District of Columbia court, it was dismissed because of prosecutorial 
misconduct. 6  In most of these cases, the PMCs settled out of court paying a pittance 
compared to what they might have if they had been tried. 
There are few domestic, regional or international laws and regulations to which 
PMCs must adhere.  Although the UN has made earnest attempts at defining and 
regulating “mercenaries,” the task is difficult and the results have been ambiguous, that is 
they do not necessarily apply to the PMCs or their employees.  As the UN Special 
Rapporteur concerning mercenaries submitted, “the need to review and update a legal 
definition [of mercenaries] would allow more effective action to eliminate mercenary 
activities and thus comply with the recommendations by the Commission on Human 
                                                 
3 Kevin M. Cahill, ed, “The Pulse of Humanitarian Assistance” (United States: The 
Center for International Humanitarian Cooperation, 2007), 72. 
4 Paul R. Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty, Why the Privatization of Government 
Functions Threatens Democracy and What We Can do About it (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 27. 
5 Tony Iyare, “Nigeria: Private Military Companies in the Niger Delta,” Pamazuka News, 
March 13, 2009. 
6 Charlie Savage, “Judge Drops Charges From Blackwater Deaths in Iraq,” The New York 
Times, December 31, 2009. 
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Rights and [the] General Assembly.” 7 In the United States, some regulatory bodies do 
exist but the PMCs may not be obligated to follow their advice.  For example, if a 
government contract is less than $50 million, it does not need Congressional approval. 
Therefore, one way to avoid this regulation is to dole out the money in increments less 
than $50 million. The companies are also supposed to comply with the United States 
International Traffic of Arms Regulations but only eight out of sixty that are stationed in 
Iraq are signatories. They elude this restraint by not being directly contracted by the 
government.8  If they are hired by the United States and working near its armed forces, 
they are subjected to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) which states 
that a civilian or employee accompanying the military overseas may be prosecuted.  On 
September 1998, South Africa passed the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 
which seems to be more a serious attempt to oversee the dispensing of licenses to PMCs.  
The act is based on the principles of international law and prohibits military corporations 
from fighting in combat. 
This thesis argues that if PMCs are not held accountable through international and 
domestic regulations, their operations will only contribute to insecurity and violence.  
There are existing laws, such as the Geneva Convention, that could be more stringently 
defined to include the modern day “mercenary”:  the private military firms.  The regional 
bodies that regulate the PMCs could also be held more culpable.  International and 
                                                 
7 Submission of the UN Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries, Enrique Bernales 
Ballesteros, “The Rights of Peoples to Self-Determination and its Application to Peoples 
Under Colonial or Alien Domination or Foreign Occupation,” United Nations, 
January 10, 2002, 24. 
8 Frontline, “Private Warriors,” June 21, 2005, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 
shows/warriors/faqs/. 
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regional judicial systems should be strengthened to include trials of PMCs or their 
employees. 
I have chosen this topic because the proliferation of PMCs is one of the 
instigating factors that is forcing the international community to analyze the concept of 
sovereignty and the handling of malcontent non-state actors 9 in the 21st Century.  The 
modern day concept of the “state” is fluid and constantly evolving.  Emerging is the 
notion of the “transnational state.”  Post colonialism and imperialism, in addition to the 
civil wars that erupted in the aftermath of the Cold War have resulted in poverty and a 
growing population of refugees.  The consequences of globalization are not only free 
trade but the dwindling of state sovereignty.  Nations such as the United States frequently 
breach other states’ sovereignty, albeit under the cover of humanitarian rule.   All of the 
above are fodder for uncivil non-state actors, giving them the impetus to strike-out at 
whomever to be the offender. 
This study is significant because if the PMCs are not forced to adhere to laws that 
civilians and soldiers must follow, more incidents of various crimes and violence will 
ensue.  First, data collected show that it is not unusual for a PMC employee to have a 
criminal background.  Second, adding the element of a third party, particularly a military 
service provider, to a volatile situation further raises the odds of illegal infractions or 
deadly consequences.  PMCs have been accused of not only igniting unnecessary 
episodes of violence but also prolonging peace processes. 
                                                 
9 For the purposes of this paper, “non-state actors” does not refer to non-violent groups 
such as NGOs. 
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Chapter 2 
Research Design 
Private Military Corporations (PMCs) are flourishing, and it is my opinion that 
the current regulations that they must adhere to are inadequate.  If these laws are not 
strengthened and respected, then there will an increase state and global insecurity.  It is 
therefore the goal of this thesis to examine the legal avenues and rules by which PMCs 
could possibly be held accountable.  With respect to the latter, I will analyze domestic 
and international judicial systems and the ways they can be strengthened. 
I will begin by detailing the history of the use of mercenaries and PMCs including 
the areas in which PMCs have been contracted, the various type of PMCs and their 
services and some of the problems associated with their use.  I will then discuss the 
existing international and regional rules, laws and courts that apply to PMCs and the 
problems involved in the applications of such rules. I will end by suggesting ways to 
strengthen regulations. I will be using three countries as case studies: Angola, Sierra 
Leone and Iraq.  Angola and Sierra Leone were chosen as premier examples of failed 
states in which PMCs also participated in a civil conflict. Iraq was chosen because of the 
prominent role that PMCs have played there. 
Definitions 
In order to describe PMCs, their history and the edicts that they must abide by, the 
term “mercenary” must be addressed.  This expression has been used to define a hired 
solider for centuries.  However, the profession, their status in society and regulations 
forced upon these soldiers all changed with the times.  The Merriam-Webster Dictionary 
5 
defines a mercenary as “one that serves merely for wages; especially…a soldier hired 
into foreign service.”1
For centuries mercenaries have been hired for combat.  Accounts of paid soldiers 
fighting in foreign regions can be found in the Bible or Ancient Greek writings such as 
those by Aristotle or Thucydides’ description of the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.). 
The earliest records of warfare include numerous mentions 
of outside fighters being employed to fight for ancient 
rulers.  The first official historic reference is of mercenaries 
who served in the army of King Shulgi of Ur (ca. 2094-
2047 B.C.E.). The battle of Kadesh (1294 B.C.E.) is the 
first great battle in history of which we have any detailed 
account.  In this fight, where the Egyptians fought the 
Hittites, the army of Pharaoh Ramses II included units of 
hired Numidians.  The rest of ancient history is replete with 
stories of hired, foreign troops. Even the Bible tells their 
tales.  The Pharaoh chased the Israelites out of Egypt with 
an army that included hired foreigners, while David and his 
men (when they were on the run from Saul) were employed 
in the Philistine army of Achish.2
A career as a hired fighter was profitable during medieval times too.  Their value 
as armies was debated in Sir Thomas Moore’s Utopia and Niccolo Machiavelli’s The 
Prince.  Many regions’ mercenaries were lauded as preeminent, such as the Swiss 
(“mercenary work became something of a national industry for the Swiss”)3 and the 
Italians (“[t]hese mercenaries were first foreign but, later, Italian; in time the most 
famous and successful of the Italian mercenary leaders, the condottieri as they were 
                                                 
1 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mercenary. 
2 P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors, The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Cornell 
University Press: New York 2002), 20. 
3 Ibid., 27. 
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called,… founded noble houses and became themselves rulers of states”).4  Many future 
states derived from feudal houses that acquired vast lands and armies consisting of hired 
soldiers.  Some of these houses became the first mercenary companies hired by 
foreigners.   
However as wealth accumulated, it became unseemly for an upper echelon in 
society to fight in battles.  The rise of Christianity further fortified the view that warfare 
was indecorous.  “The further states progressed from tribalism and the more civilized 
they became, the more, logically, they tended to use mercenary troops.  The logic was 
simple and unanswerable: war being a barbaric pursuit, the citizens of a rich and 
flourishing state preferred to hire needy foreigners to fight for them rather than to have to 
interrupt their own rich and profitable lives.”5
A series of peace agreements in 1648 known as the Peace Westphalia marked the 
official origin of “the state” and the notion of sovereignty.  Additionally: 
[a]s the Enlightenment took hold, ideas of the social 
contract…provided a new way of  thinking about the 
relationship of state to soldiers and citizenship to 
service…people were more  willing to fight as citizens than 
as subjects.  Those who fought for profit, rather than 
patriotism, were completely delegitimized under these new 
conceptions…. Although the domestic tradeoff was risky to 
their security as rulers, the adoption of a citizen army was 
seen as the internationally efficient and necessary outcome 
for those states that sought to survive….[R]egarding the 
impermeability of their borders….[t]hey had to be able to 
show they could defend themselves without having to hire 
external help.6
                                                 
4 Anthony Mockler, The New Mercenaries, the History of the Hired Solider from the 
Congo to the Seychelles (New York:  Paragon House Publishers, 1985), 7. 
5 Ibid., 7. 
6 Singer, 30-31. 
7 
Advancements in weapons were consequential in “the decline of mercenary warfare 
[which] coincided with the emergence of large armies as the scale of warfare began to 
increase.”7 Additionally, many powerful companies such as the Dutch East India 
Company and the English East India Company in the 16th and 17th Centuries conducted 
their affairs as sovereign entities.  They had sovereign rights; they owned land and 
conscripted their own armies.8  “The English East India Company hired a mix of British, 
German, and Swiss mercenaries.…[T]he company’s army was over 100,000 men, much 
larger than the British army at the time.  The Dutch company also grew from its modest 
beginnings and soon had more than 140 ships and 25,000 men….”9
These conscripted armies began the age of the decline of the number of 
mercenaries, although they were used in various wars in the 18th, 19th and 20th Centuries, 
such as the American Revolution, Battle of Waterloo, World Wars I and II and Vietnam.  
Hired armed forces were used in governments’ covert operations during the 20th Century 
such as the Bay of Pigs or Congolese civil war.  However, since the inception of the state 
and conscripted armies, freelancing soldiers were no longer vetted as they were in the 
past.  It was not until the postcolonial transition that their numbers increased as in South 
Africa.  The accounts of violence and instability forced the United Nations (UN) and 
some governments to address the definition of mercenaries and their legality. 
In the early Geneva Conventions (1949), contracted military were not referenced.  
The only equivalent mention is a “supply contractor” who if captured did receive prisoner 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 35. 
9 Ibid. 
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of war status. Geneva Convention  III (1949), seemed to expand the prisoner of war 
status to include mercenaries or they could be held until a tribunal commenced to decide 
on their status.  According to Geneva Convention IV (1949), a mercenary could claim to 
be a “protected person” as it refers to participating in combat in a foreign country (not 
including states not bound by the Geneva Convention). In 1977, the United Nations’ 
Geneva Convention Protocol I stated the prevailing stance on mercenaries:  First, a 
mercenary does not have the right “to be a combatant or a prisoner of war”2  Second, it 
defines a mercenary as: 
2. A mercenary is any person who: 
(a) is especially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an 
armed conflict;  
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;  
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire 
for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party 
to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of 
that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions 
in the armed forces of that Party;  
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of 
territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;  
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and  
(f) has not been sent by a [s]tate which is not a Party to the conflict on 
official duty as a member of its armed forces. 3 
                                                 
2 “Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),” Part III, Article 47, 
June 8, 1977. 
3 Ibid. 
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Interestingly, neither the United States, Iraq nor India have ratified Protocols I (1977) or 
II (1977).  The United Kingdom and France have ratified all of the additional 
amendments. 
Regulations 
Since the 18th century the activities of mercenaries have been regulated.  The first 
international policy that attempted to regulate mercenaries was the United States 
Neutrality Law (1794).  This law forbade a United States (US) citizen from enlisting in 
another nation’s army, using a citizen’s ship to fight in another nation’s war or enlisting 
others to fight for another nation, particularly an ally. “It was the United States that first 
attempted to specify a universal doctrine of neutrality and to institutionalize practices 
consistent with the doctrine….”4  Throughout the 19th Century, other nations soon 
followed the United States by passing neutrality laws.  However, these laws were 
codified for reasons other than poaching soldiers: 
[C]ontrols on mercenaries had less to do with neutrality 
than with enhancing state authority over people,  In this 
period, states were attempting to form mass, national 
armies, a process that entailed the state’s claim to a 
monopoly on its citizens’ or subjects’ military service.  In 
short…[the] state claimed a monopoly on the authority to 
organize violence within its borders, even if it were 
organized for deployment beyond its borders. “The 
fundamental purpose of the Neutrality Act[s]…lay in 
strengthening the authority of the central government vis-à-
vis its citizens, particularly with respect to warfare.”  
[quoting Jules Lobel, “This Rise and Decline of the 
Neutrality Act: Sovereignty and Congressional War Powers 
in the Unites States Foreign Policy,” Harvard International 
Law Journal 24:24-25 (Summer 1983)].  The act[s] were 
meant to secure the central state’s exclusive authority to 
make war… 
                                                 
4 Janice E. Thompson, Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), 79 (emphasis in the original). 
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State leaders did not set out to eliminate mercenarism since 
most of them benefited from it. Instead, their common 
interest in building state power vis-à-vis society produced 
an international norm against mercenarism.5
The US passed the Pinkerton Act in 1893 which made it unlawful for the 
government to hire anyone, strictly interpreted, from a specific detective agency but in 
1977 it was ruled that it might possibly extend to mercenaries. In 1819 and 1870 the 
United Kingdom codified the Foreign Enlistment Acts which prohibited a freelance 
soldier from fighting in a war against a British ally. 
As mentioned previously, the Geneva Convention’s (1949) only corresponding 
reference to a private soldier is a “supply contractor.”   It was not until the mid-1960s that 
soldiers for hire began to be considered an international problem.  In 1968 the United 
Nations’ General Assembly passed Resolution 2465 which stated that it was illegal for a 
mercenary to fight in another countries’ civil war.  Soon after, the United Nations 
reinforced this condemnation of freelance soldiers by defining a mercenary in the Geneva 
Convention’s Protocol I in 1977, as previously discussed. 
In 1989, the International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing 
and Training of Mercenaries was passed.  As of 2011, only sixteen countries are 
signatories of this treaty6; the countries where most PMCs reside including the United 
States and the United Kingdom are not members.  This convention expanded the 
definition of mercenaries, as well as those that recruit and train them, and the states that 
contract them.  Article 1 states: 
For the purposes of the present Convention, 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 86-88. 
6 Sourcewatch.org, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/. 
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1. A mercenary is any person who: 
(g) Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed 
conflict; 
(h) Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire 
for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party 
to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of 
that promised or paid to combatants of similar rank and functions 
in the armed forces of that party; 
(i) Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of 
territory controlled by a party to the conflict; 
(j) Is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and 
(k) Has not been sent by a [s]tate which is not a party to the conflict on 
official duty as a member of its armed forces. 
2. A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation: 
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of 
participating in a concerted act of violence aimed at: 
(i) Overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the 
constitutional order of a [s]tate; or 
(ii) Undermining the territorial integrity of a [s]tate; 
(b) Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for 
significant private gain and is prompted by the promise or payment 
of material compensation; 
(c) Is neither a national nor a resident of the [s]tate against which such 
an act is directed; 
(d) Has not been sent by a [s]tate on official duty; and 
(e) Is not a member of the armed forces of the [s]tate on whose 
territory the act is undertaken. 
ARTICLE 2 
Any person who recruits, uses, finances or trains 
mercenaries, as defined in article 1 of the present 
Convention, commits an offence for the purposes of the 
Convention… 
12 
ARTICLE 3 
1. A mercenary, as defined in article 1 of the present 
Convention, who participates directly in hostilities or in a 
concerted act of violence, as the case may be, commits an 
offence for the purposes of the Convention… 
ARTICLE 5 
1. States Parties shall not recruit, use, finance or train 
mercenaries and shall prohibit such activities in accordance 
with the provisions of the present Convention. 
2. States Parties shall not recruit, use, finance or train 
mercenaries for the purpose of opposing the legitimate 
exercise of the inalienable right of peoples to self-
determination, as recognized by international law, and shall 
take, in conformity with international law, the appropriate 
measures to prevent the recruitment, use, financing or 
training of mercenaries for that purpose.7
Since 1989, the office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has sponsored a 
resolution, The Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding 
the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, expressing, in general, 
concern over the use of mercenaries, particularly in developing countries and urging all 
nations who have not done so, to ratify the 1989 convention discussed supra. 
Literature 
Since the emergence of the state at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the 
subsequent period of Enlightenment, security has been seen as the essential provision of 
the natural contract between a state and its citizens.  A state must secure its borders, 
protecting its inhabitants and its interests. “States exist…because they have proven 
themselves adept at protecting and promoting certain fundamental values.  The values 
                                                 
7 United Nations, General Assembly, “International Convention Against the 
Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries,” A/RES/44/34 December 4, 
1989. 
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that we most commonly look to the [s]tate to provide are order, rights, collective goods, 
and security from external threats.”8  International guidelines such as the UN Charter 
were developed in an attempt to maintain peace among the nations.  Since civilians 
typically bear the brunt of wars, other conventions such as the Geneva Conventions and 
the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Rome Statute have attempted to prevent odious 
crimes such as genocide or mass rapes.  Conversely, the state or its institutions, such as 
its military, have sometimes been guilty of breaching the contact with its citizens by 
waging violence on them too: 
The problem, of course, is that the state’s use of violence 
on behalf of security is subject to abuses of many kinds, 
including violations of the human rights of the state’s own 
citizens and aggression against other states, abuses are 
often rationalized as necessary to deal with security threats.  
The power of the state can be – and often has been a force 
for tremendous evil when it has not been subjected to 
adequate checks, when it has been wielded by unscrupulous 
rulers, and when it has been placed in the service of 
inhumane projects. …[D]uring the twentieth century more 
people died at the hands of their own governments than 
were killed in all of the century’s wars combined.9
By the 1980s, non-state actors were gaining in importance, often posing a quandary for 
the state. As Dan Caldwell notes, the prevailing view has been that “[s]imply put, the 
state may kill; other actors may not. …The way the world is organized, terrorists, 
criminal gangs, and disgruntled individuals have no right to employ violence.  This is 
                                                 
8 Dan Caldwell and Robert E. Williams Jr., Seeking Security in an Insecure World 
(United States: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2006), 119. 
9 Ibid. 
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what Hobbes had in mind in presenting Leviathan as the necessary substitute for the war 
of each against all.”10
In international relations theory, realism conceptualized society as anarchical; 
people are always in a state of conflict, warring over limited resources to survive.  
“‘Ultimately, conflict and war are rooted in human nature….’”11  According to Thomas 
Hobbes, to avoid a “poor, nasty, brutish and short,”12 life, people had to renounce all of 
their freedoms and acquiesce to the laws of a state (“[d]uring the time men live without a 
common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that conditions called war; and such a 
war, as if of every man, against every man”).13  In return, the nation’s primary 
responsibility is protection. 
In his piece, “War making and State Making as Organized Crime,” Charles Tilly 
makes the analogy that governments are simply “racketeers” who invoke fallacious fears 
and increase the military in order to give the appearance of  protecting the citizens: 
[C]onsider the definition of a racketeer as someone who 
creates a threat and then charges for its reduction. 
Governments’ provision of protection, by this standard, 
often qualifies as racketeering. To the extent that the threats 
against which a given government protects its citizens are 
imaginary or are consequences of its own activities, the 
government has organized a protection racket. Since 
governments themselves commonly simulate, stimulate, or 
even fabricate threats of external war and since the 
repressive and extractive activities of governments often 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 120. 
11 Scott Burchill, et al,. Theories of International Relations, 3d (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), 31. 
12 Donnelly, 33. 
13 Thomas Hobbes, Philosophy Paradise, Leviathan, http://www.philosophyparadise.com/ 
quotes/ hobbes.html. 
15 
constitute the largest current threats to the livelihoods of 
their own citizens, many governments operate in essentially 
the same ways as racketeers. There is, of course, a 
difference: Racketeers, by the conventional definition, 
operate without the sanctity of governments. How do 
racketeer governments themselves acquire authority? As a 
question of fact and of ethics, that is one of the oldest 
conundrums of political analysis. Back to Machiavelli and 
Hobbes, nevertheless, political observers have recognized 
that, whatever else they do, governments organize and, 
wherever possible, monopolize violence.14
Even though a government’s claim of external threats may be fabricated, the 
constant threat of impending war is fundamental to realism.  It not only meets the 
classical realist conception of human nature as being distrustful and on the defensive,15 
but also war making is profitable. A bustling military industrial complex and ongoing 
wars increase a state’s profits by manufacturing weapons, reaping the rewards of the 
victor and its chances of survival by protecting its borders:  “[S]tates ‘at minimum, seek 
their own preservation and, at maximum, drive for universal domination’…. 
[additionally] states seek wealth, advantage and flourishing….”16
PMCs have had numerous accusations of human rights violations made against 
them.   However because of a combination of lack of regulations and the domestic 
political climate in sending counties, most allegations have either not been investigated or 
the PMC has quietly settled with the victims.   Given the focus on state security, and the 
use of PMCs by states, it can be said that many states exhibit a tendency to prioritize 
                                                 
14 Charles Tilly, “War Making and States Making as Organized Crime,” In Bringing the 
State Back In, Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, eds. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1985), 171. 
15 “Even where one is not seeking gain, fear of others leads to defensive war, for ‘there is 
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states over people in this area.  Donnelly quotes Hans Morgenthau, “‘The actions of 
states are determined not by moral principles and legal commitments but by 
considerations of interest and power.’”17
Post World War II, the advocates of realism, began to encourage waging wars (for 
example, the Vietnam War) in order to defend their nation.  “‘[W]ar, not peace, is the 
norm in international relations.’ Diplomacy is a zero-sum power game in which the end is 
not international stasis but the [protection and] advancement of national interests.…”18  
Beginning in the 1980s, many of these same proponents began to promote clandestine, 
small wars such as in Latin America.  Many of those who staged or helped train 
insurgents to fight these secret wars in Latin America and elsewhere had participated in 
Vietnam.  They were: 
precursors to the private defense contractors like DynCorp 
and Blackwater who today do security and logistical work 
for the [US] military and its allies in places like Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Columbia….Just as [other] wars produced 
a generation of itinerant soldiers, many of them from the 
losing side, who put their energies into informally 
expanding [US] power in Central America and the 
Caribbean, Vietnam resulted in a legion of mercenaries 
who worked the trouble spots of the American empire.19
In the 1990s, the use of mercenaries grew as private contractors were hired to help 
governments defeat rebels in civil wars.  The end of the Cold War removed the bipolar 
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benefactors from states that already had weakened institutions.  These states’ already 
delicate institutions, such as their military, were made frailer when their foreign 
benefactors closed their coffers.  Eliminating the super powers’ political and economic 
support seemed to have caused numerous wars.  “The incidence of civil wars has doubled 
since the Cold War’s end and by the mid-1990s was actually five times as high as at its 
midpoint.  The broader number of conflict zones (i.e., places in the world war) has 
roughly doubled.”20  International conflicts also arose.  It was anticipated that the UN 
could attempt to fill the super powers’ void by maintaining control of the weaker states 
but it lacked the funds.   Subsequently, globalization brought rising poverty levels, and 
with it, rising class and ethnic conflict. 
The theory of liberalism, can also be used in analyzing the current uses of PMCs.  
Based on the ideologies of the period of  Enlightenment (spurred on by thinkers who 
were very critical of the sovereign states of their time, such as John Locke, Thomas Paine 
and Jean-Jacques Rousseau), liberalism posits that in order for a society to prosper, and to 
be peaceful, all that is necessary is democracy and free trade. “War was a cancer on the 
body politic….the ‘disease’ of war could be successfully treated with the twin medicines 
of democracy and free trade.”21  Society will then be equipped to peacefully flourish. 
Since the period of Enlightenment, many Western countries have used liberal 
economic policies, tinkering with them along the way.  The 1980s brought a period of 
neo-liberalism which was also a time of extreme conservatism. This era was the inception 
of  a thirty year trend of privatization.  These policies were implemented and nurtured by 
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two leaders:  President Ronald Reagan of the United States and Prime Minister Margret 
Thatcher of Britain.  These partners began dismantling unions, such as the Air Traffic 
Controllers in the United States, deregulating the financial sectors, cutting government 
spending and in the United Kingdom’s case, closing state owned corporations.  During 
the 1990s, President Bill Clinton continued on the course of privatization by selling state 
corporations and contracts. 
Globalization also reinforced privatization.  “In sum, the 1990’s saw 
unprecedented levels of privatization.  By 1998, the rate of global privatization was 
roughly doubling each year.  This ‘privatization revolution’ went hand in hand with 
globalization; both trends embraced the notion that comparative advantage and 
competition maximize efficiency and effectiveness.”22
Privatization continued under G.W. Bush’s presidency (2001-2009).  Other global 
leaders such as Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain, followed suit.  This had an effect on 
the military: the end of the Cold War resulted in the slashing of roughly 7 million soldiers 
from the global standing armies during the 1990s.23 According to Scahill (quoting Dan 
Briody), “‛In his first year in office, Cheney reduced military spending by $10 billion…. 
[H]e reduced the number of troops from 2.2 million to 1.6 million. … The army 
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depended very  little on civilian contractors in the early 1990s and Cheney was inclined 
to change that.’” 24  Scahill continues: 
[B]y late August 1992, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
had selected Halliburton, soon to be run by Cheney 
himself, to do virtually all of the support work for the 
military over the next five years.  That first Halliburton 
contract burst open the door for the rapid privatization that 
would culminate in the contracting bonanza in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and elsewhere ushered in by the war on 
terror.25
To secure their investments from hostility abroad, MNCs began contracting 
private security forces: 
The [US] State department lists 74 countries in which 
physical security is a problem of which 34 endure actual 
civil war or rebel insurgency.  In many of these places 
national corporation facilities are often at the epicenter of 
conflicts.  For example, oil industry facilities and pipelines 
are the focal point of fighting ranging from Algeria to 
Azerbaijan and mining corporation sites are contested in 
Congo, Sierra Leone, and Angola.26
The rise of violent non-state actors has also increased the contracting of PMCs.  The non-
state actors, which also include the PMCs, have acquired the most advanced weapons. 
Thus, PMCs are hired with their panoply of weapons to potentially fight others who are 
similarly situated.  As can be seen the realist state interest, the rise of liberalization and 
the effects of globalization have all contributed to the impetus for the contemporary 
proliferation of PMCs. 
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Chapter 3 
Growth of PMCs, Pros and Cons 
Reasons for Growth 
For reasons elaborated in the last chapter, it has become the norm for 
governments and private entities to hire Private Military Corporations (PMCs).  
Governments posit that a standing army is too expensive to do the array of tasks that are 
called for post 9/11, such as fighting wars, clandestine projects that are conducted “to 
prevent terrorism” or necessary emergency assistance, such as the aftermaths of natural 
disasters.  Since the 1980s, the invisible hand of liberal economics has extended its reach 
globally as well as domestically, resulting in increasing privatization and government cut 
backs.  PMCs have supplanted workers from private enterprises or government 
employees. 
As previously stated, the definition and view of mercenaries has changed over the 
centuries.  At the turn of the 18th Century, many countries codified Neutrality Laws 
which prohibited fighting in a foreign military service or as a mercenary.  In 1907, the 
Hague Convention stated that:  “Corps of combatants cannot be formed nor recruiting 
agencies opened on the territory of a neutral Power to assist the belligerents.”1  During 
the next few centuries, the role of mercenaries declined but they were involved in most 
wars up until and after WW II.  It was the utilizing of “rogue” soldiers in Africa in the 
1970s that led to the formulation of international protocols against employing hired guns.  
“Legal commentators expressly acknowledge that Article 47 of Additional Protocol I was 
inserted to appease African nations and was intentionally narrow in its scope of 
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application.”2  As previously explained, Protocol I (1977),  an addendum  to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, defined mercenaries narrowly, stated that they are prohibited from 
participating in battle, and shall not be considered as prisoners of war.  In general, the 
convention condemned the business of contracted soldiers. 
PMCs grew over a span of a thirty year period.  In the beginning they were 
recruited individually and typically, they were covertly utilized by governments.  
However many of the same players have existed throughout this period or are precursors 
to today’s PMCs.  Since many of the mercenaries who were hired guns in bloody 
conflicts in African nations such as Angola, originally had their roots in apartheid in 
South Africa, the contracted, roving soldier became a vile vocation.  It was not until the 
end of the Vietnam War that the contemporary version of this old profession began to be 
encouraged.  Many nationalists vehemently believed they must wage or train others to 
fight covert wars in order to maintain their nation’s supremacy or security which they 
believed was being threatened by communists, or others. Private soldiers were hired to 
train battalions or to fight in these skirmishes.  These advocates of war were the 
antecedents to the PMCs of today. 
As mentioned in chapter 2, globalization escalated tensions between classes, and 
weakened some states aggravating social and ethnic division.  Heightening the need for 
the PMCs was the cutbacks of millions in the global standing armies during the 1990s.  In 
order to deal with civil strife, terrorists, or simply to maintain supremacy, some large 
powers turned to PMCs.  It was during Operation Desert Storm that PMCs began to be 
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incorporated and hired in earnest.  Additionally, the rise of aggressive non-state actors 
has also resulted in the contracting of PMCs.  With the collapse of the communist 
regimes, weapons have become very accessible and affordable.  Non-state actors who 
might be interested in weapons, such as PMCs or terrorists are able to acquire the most 
advanced weapons.  “Now many private forces have the most sophisticated weapons 
systems available to them, including fighter aircraft and advanced artillery, and can even 
outgun state forces.”3  Consequently, to address increased violence the dominant states 
increasingly hire PMCs:  “The result is that there has been an overall decay of state 
armed forces in developing regions.  Given the increasing inadequacies of local military 
and security forces, compared to the rising challenges, it is no surprise that national and 
corporate leaders would choose to bring in help from whatever quarter is available, 
including even the private sphere.”4  In order to address civil wars or human rights 
violations, the United Nations (UN), which does not have a standing army and has a 
limited amount of resources,  also hires PMCs:  “Scattered across the continent, UN 
Peacekeeping missions, for instance, are a goldmine for PM[C]’s.”5  Often dominant 
states have objected to sending in their troops for other region’s conflicts, such as the 
genocide in Rwanda.  Furthermore, PMCs are typically employed to protect the 
multinational corporations (MNCs) foreign investments (such as oil refineries) from 
disgruntled non-state actors. 
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Pros and Cons of PMCs 
The modern hired “soldier” differs from past soldiers in that the “PM[C]s are 
organized in business form” and are “driven by business profit rather than individual 
profit.  PM[C]s function as registered trade units, not as personal black-market ventures 
for individual profit or adventure. As firms, they make use of complex corporate 
financing, ranging from stock shares to intra-firm trade, meaning a wider variety of deals 
and contracts can be worked out.”6
Many of the current PMCs are part of MNCs with ties to security or energy, such 
as Halliburton or Northup Grumman. “By the end of 2001, Halliburton had a market 
capitalization of almost $21 billion, with almost 80 percent owned by institutional 
holders. The Engineering and Construction Group (also known as Kellogg, Brown & 
Root)…comprised roughly 40 percent of this total revenue.”7 As Singer notes: “Such ties 
provide a whole new level of both legitimacy and connections for PM[C]s.  In addition, 
they allow the firms greater access to financial capital and also have on call other 
corporate resources.”8  Presently, there are three types of PMCs:  First are the military 
provider firms who do engage in battle. These are the firms that are most criticized 
because they hire and train soldiers to fight in wars.  Many PMCs do not provide these 
services. Examples of these types of firms are Executive Outcomes and Sandline (these 
firms will be discussed in chapter 4).  These two firms are no longer in existence.  
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However similar groups such as the Olive Group, which offers training ranging from 
anti-piracy courses to “counter terrorist training,” have flourished.9
Another type of PMCs are the military consulting companies such as Aegis, 
Ardan or Military Professional Resources Incorporated, which are not hired to fight 
during armed conflicts but provide services which are necessary to wage war, such as 
training forces and strategic analysis.  A third type are the military support firms such as 
Vinnell which provide non-fatal assistance, such as logistics, supplies or construction.  
“The military support sector is not only the largest in scope and revenue, but also the 
most varied in subsectors.   Interestingly, it is also the sector least explored in the context 
of military privatizing.”10  PMCs (and therefore the security industrial complex) have 
permeated every arena imaginable.11  In the United States (US), besides helping fight in 
the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, they have been contracted to build prisons, work in a 
nation’s top security agencies the National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence 
Agency, work in natural disaster relief, train both domestic and foreign police,  and scout 
for movie locations in undesirable areas. 
The Obama administration “has significantly increased military and intelligence 
operations, paying contractors to spy and training local operatives to chase terrorists [i]n 
roughly a dozen countries — from the deserts of North Africa, to the mountains of 
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Pakistan, to former Soviet republics crippled by ethnic and religious strife.”12  In 
December 2009, many civilians were killed in Yemen during a covert mission run by the 
Central intelligence Agency, the Pentagon and private security contractors.  “By [U.S.] 
law, covert action programs require presidential authorization and formal notification to 
the Congressional intelligence committees.  No such requirements apply to the military’s 
so-called Special Access Programs, like the Yemen strikes.”13
Many promulgate the notion that PMCs are not only necessary but beneficial. 
Globally, there has been an increase in war while there have been cuts to the military.   
The United Nations does not have the resources to meet the demands of many theatres of 
war or peace keeping missions.  It is “[t]heir essential belief …that ‘[p]rivate 
companies…can do it faster, better, and much cheaper than the United Nations.’”14  The 
United States is spread too thin.  William Reno argues that PMCs are agents by which the 
stronger states implement their post Cold War foreign policies to protect societies from 
emerging entities such as malevolent non-state actors.  Reno suggests (as do others) that 
neither the United Nations nor the hegemonic states can fulfill the role of “international 
police.”  Interfering in a state’s conflict is costly.   Hiring a PMC may curb expenditures 
as well as allow the stronger states to clandestinely impose their foreign policies on the 
weaker states, while simultaneously shoring up the residual damage of colonialism.   
People who tout PMCs point to the money that is saved compared to the price of an army 
where a pension is one of the components of a soldier’s package.  A PMC contractor is 
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only paid by the client for services rendered instead of states maintaining standing armed 
forces with pension plans. 
Reno further speculates on the PMCs’ roles in global relations during the 21st 
Century and the new notion of sovereignty.  He does not refute Charles Tilly’s idea of 
racketeer governments and instilling fear in their citizens.  He refutes the idea that 
because a PMC can be vast, wealthy and acquire weapons, then in theory, similar to the 
Dutch East India and the English East India Companies in the 16th and 17th centuries, 
they could become a state.   He does, however, agree that a PMC can aid in state 
building.  Reno suggests that after the Cold War, the remaining strong states (particularly 
the United States and the United Kingdom) have hired the PMCs as a political instrument 
in their foreign policy kit.  They employ the PMCs to implement their foreign policies, 
while simultaneously helping the weaker states resolve conflicts.  Once conflict is 
resolved, the PMCs will have aided the fragile state in turning its attention to state 
building.  “Thus private security has…had a role in reinforcing the international state 
system, especially in its periphery.  It has helped shore up client regimes and bolsters 
their local control over and capacity to manage state-like functions on the diplomatic and 
economic margins of international society, especially when organized at the behest of 
officials in more powerful states.”15
Reno also hypothesizes that because the PMCs enter a state at the “behest of” its 
officials, this may be a sufficient “excuse” for the core powers to interfere in a nation’s 
conflict.  Furthermore, this alleviates any debates concerning sovereignty.  Nevertheless, 
it does not cover the incidents such as the Iraq war where PMCs (and standing military 
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units) have been involved.  This “preemptive” conflict was not sanctioned by the Iraqi 
leader, or the UN.  Additionally, Reno conjectures that most of the PMCs come from the 
stronger states and that their employees are typically interconnected with their military 
institutions. Therefore, the PMCs are familiar with the customs and ideals that the core 
countries want to promote globally.  He approves of the intervention of core countries in 
the peripheries because of the violence that a person or a group may wreak in society.  If 
a weak state can not control its citizens, then to maintain international order, a PMC can 
be hired to do so. 
PMCs also permit leaders to enter explosive situations without the public’s 
knowledge: “‘[a] private contractor helps keep things under the radar,’”16  Many 
countries do not regulate PMCs properly and there are many loopholes that could be 
utilized.  In this respect a leader can maintain deniability allowing “the government to 
achieve foreign-policy goals free from the need to secure [legislative] approval and safe 
in the knowledge that should a situation deteriorate, official…participation can be 
denied.”17  Furthermore, PMC casualties are often seen as less grievous than the death of 
soldiers in a country’s armed forces. 
PMCs have many critics too.  Many say that PMCs disrupt the contract between 
the state and its armed forces.  The separation of the two branches provides a measure of 
balance with the army signing on to protect the state.  “[T]he whole of civil-military 
                                                 
16 Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater, The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army 
(New York: Nation Books, 2007), 173 (quoting Nathan Hodge, “After the Gold Rush,” 
Slate.com, http://www.slate.com/id/2135362/, February 9, 2006). 
17 David J. Francis, “Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone: Providing National 
Security or International Exploitation,” Third World Quarterly, Vol.. 20, No. 2 (1999): 
334. 
28 
relations theory, regardless of its viewpoint, sticks to this general assumption of a 
dualistic balance between soldiers and state.  Presently, civil-military relations theory 
does not fully account for any potential role of external, third-party influences on this 
two-sided structure.”18  The critics claim that PMCs help further weaken institutions such 
as the armed forces and they possibly weaken an already frail state.  The military unit of a 
nation is a vital, public institution.  It is an entity whose members have been entrusted to 
protect citizens under the legal obligation to not usurp power or commit heinous acts 
during service. 
Critics also point to potential conflicts arising between the military service 
providers and the armed forces when they are forced together in a theatre of conflict.  The 
PMCs earn an exponentially larger sum than the soldiers do, which can result in fissures 
and resentment:  “We were bigger than life to a lot of the military guys.’ said ex-
Blackwater contractor Kelly Capeheart.  ‘You could see it in their eyes when they looked 
at us – or whispered about us.  A lot of them were very jealous.  They felt like they were 
doing the same job but getting paid a lot less.’”19  Since the two entities do not typically 
train together, during precarious moments, dangerous incidents can arise. 
Detractors of military contractors posit that if a PMC enters into a conflict in a 
frail nation, it can further weaken a possibly already failed state.  If a PMC is hired to 
enter the fray, it may heighten and prolong the conflict: 
The introduction of a third party into the mix, specifically 
private military firms, only further complicates the 
situation.  Even in stable countries, where the risk of 
military coups or mutiny is relatively unthinkable, the rise 
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of the privatized military industry raises concerns about the 
relations among public authorities and the military 
apparatus. PM[C]s not only reshape the institutional 
balance of regime and military, but can also have an almost 
shocking impact on civil-military relations.20
Furthermore, a third party might harm foreign policy relations.  Countries (even during 
times of war) continue to conduct affairs with one another.   If another party commits acts 
that violate state sovereignty or human rights laws, this may ruin countries’ long standing 
associations.  Moreover, a PMC is typically viewed by the public as representing the 
country where it is based even the company was hired by a MNC.  “When Western 
governments are unwilling to intervene in a domestic conflict, mercenary armies are 
covertly supported to do their ‘dirty’ jobs. …‘[T]hese mercenary companies are seen as 
an essential part of the new world order as developing countries are desperately trying 
now to establish stability and economic prosperity.’”21
Although some PMCs’ websites state in their mission statements that they will not 
be contracted by revolutionary forces, most military companies go where the money 
takes them; their employees range from Non-Governmental Organizations to MNCs.  If a 
contractor commits a heinous act, there are no clear laws to adjudicate them.  Further 
complicating matters, PMCs are non-state actors therefore certain international laws that 
a state must abide by, such as human rights laws, do not affect them.  The domestic, 
regional and international regulations concerning mercenaries are vague or not strictly 
administered, which results in a lot of non-compliance.  Moreover, for an array of reasons 
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that will be discussed later, domestic and international courts have been dilatory in giving 
opinions on PMCs. 
31 
Chapter 4 
Case Studies 
To further highlight the pros and cons of PMCs in the international arena, these 
cases, Angola, Sierra Leone and Iraq, are all described in this chapter. 
Angola 
The first incidence of mercenaries in Angola was rogue infantry men who joined 
the post-colonial fight that quickly turned into a Cold War battle. Beginning in 1975, 
after fighting the Portuguese for independence, the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola (MPLA) battled for control of the nation.  It was an ideological war in which the 
United States and South Africa backed the UNITA and the Soviet Union and the Cubans 
supported the MPLA.  The mercenaries who helped UNITA fight this war were 
individuals who came from all over the world, but were mostly Europeans. The United 
States Central Intelligence Agency covertly hired the mercenaries. 
The MPLA won this leg of the civil war.  The mercenaries that fought for UNITA 
were captured by the MPLA.  Author Manuel Rui Monteiro said of the imprisoned 
freelance soldiers: “‘You were a foreigner.  You came to a country that was not your own 
from a land far away, you came voluntarily, you came with guns.  What are guns for?  
For killing.  You were paid for killing. You are a hired killer, a paid assassin, guilty of 
aggression and invasion, guilty of crimes against peace, guilty of the crime of 
mercenarism.’”1  Montiero was referring to the 1968 United Nations General Assembly’s 
Resolution 2465 which stated that it was prohibited for a mercenary to fight in another 
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country’s civil war.  The mercenaries were indicted and put on trial.  On the day of 
sentencing, the presiding judge noted that:  
[A]ll the mercenaries had known exactly what they had 
been hired to do, with the complicity of their governments. 
They had “spread fear, shame and outrage, mangled 
children, laid bare the people with bayonets.” [According to 
him:] “Packs of dogs of war with bloodstained muzzles” 
could not claim prisoner-of-war status or protection of any 
conventions. For they were “foreigners with knives 
between their teeth who had come to spread dark wounds 
across the country” who had “silenced with bullets the clear 
laughter of the youth.”2
Some of the clan of armed soldiers were sentenced to death by firing squad, while others 
were given fifteen to thirty years in prison. 
The war over Angola continued into this century.  What is interesting is that when 
mercenaries rejoined the battle, they were hired by the government to fight against 
UNITA. What is also intriguing is that the same group of mercenaries, a Private Military 
Corporation (PMC) called Executive Outcomes (EO) was utilized in both Angola and 
subsequently, Sierra Leone.  Their back story is a common one with PMCs: they are 
typically subsidiaries or connected to either an energy multinational corporation (MNC) 
or a military industrial MNC.  EO was founded in 1989 by many of the South African 
Defense Force (SADF) infantry from the notorious 32nd Battalion: “[k]nwon as the 
‘terrible ones’ by its opponents, the 32nd was honored at the time for having the highest 
kill ratio of any unit in the SADF but later accused of egregious human rights violations 
by the South African Truth Commission.”3  EO is a subsidiary of Strategic Resources 
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Corporation (SRC), which is connected to the Branch-Heritage Group (BHG). BHG 
“includes a number of mining and oil concerns…[and] has investments in almost all the 
areas where [EO] has conducted major operations.” BHG also has its own PMCs, 
Sandline International and Ibis Air.4
In 1993, UNITA factions seized an oilfield owned by BHG.  The Angolan 
government (after years of civil war, now the Forcas Armadas Angolanas [FAA]) hired 
EO. The EOs and the FAA retook control of the oilfield.  This “demonstrated that a 
private firm could play an integral role in a conflict, by providing military services for 
hire to the highest bidder.” 5  Consequently,  EO left Angola and  the UNITA recaptured 
the oil refinery once again.   EO soon returned to successfully duplicate their efforts. In 
November of 1994, there was a peace agreement with the UNITA rebels which called for 
EO to leave Angola.  EO stayed until President Clinton insisted that they leave the 
country in 1995 (allegedly, President Clinton wanted the American PMC, Military 
Professional Resources Incorporated, to be contracted in the oil rich region).  Following 
EO’s departure, civil war erupted once again. 
[This was] to become a  recurrent theme with 
EO...Although some critics say [EO’s] success in Angola 
has been overstated, it is evident that it played a 
determinate role in ending that stage of war.  The 
company’s arrival coincided with the exact turning point in 
the government’s war effort.  It not only contributed 
training and tactical advice, but also played a critical active 
role in operations that exploited UNITA’s weakness and 
destroyed its morale.  EO provided the Angolan army with 
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crucial military expertise that it lacked, giving it a distinct 
edge over its opponent.6
Additionally, the “series of military defeats suffered by UNITA thanks to EO’s direct 
military assistance forced the rebel movement to the negotiating table. …,EO’s 
immediate strategic impact created the conditions for negotiations and a peace settlement, 
something which the UN. …had not been able to achieve.”7
Sierra Leone 
Immediately after the Angola conflict, EO entered an ongoing civil war in Sierra 
Leone in 1995.  Sierra Leone’s history is extremely convoluted.  It was originally 
founded for ex-slaves but it soon became a protectorate of Britain.  Due to its mineral 
rich land (Sierra Leone has immense quantities of diamonds, rutile, titanium and bauxite), 
it attracted many miners.  The influx of foreigners and the relocating of free slaves, in 
addition to the region’s original inhabitants of approximately thirteen tribes, all 
culminated in a disconnected population. However, it was a poor country.  In 1985 
“Sierra Leone’s GNP had dwindled…to one of the lowest in Africa. …The levels of 
impoverishment, social and generational exclusion, had fuelled social unrest, and state 
repression had reached alarming proportions.”8  The climate was also ripe for corruption.  
By the time that the civil war broke out in 1991, Sierra Leone was a kleptocarcy. 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 110. 
7 David J. Francis, “Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone: Providing National Security 
or International Exploitation,” Third World Quarterly, Vol.. 20, No. 2 (1999): 329. 
8 Abdel-Fatau Musah, “A Country Under Siege: State Decay and Corporate Military 
Intervention in Sierra Leone,” Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma (London: 
Pluto Press, 2000), 82-83. 
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Due to the array of mines, mercenaries were not an unusual entity in Sierra Leone.  
Many individual armed guards or burgeoning PMCs were contracted to guard the mines.  
In 1991, a civil war began between the government and the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF).  After a stint by one PMC, Gurkha Security Group, where one of its soldiers was 
eaten by the rebels,9 other PMCs declined to accept Sierra Leone’s offer, except EO.  
Besides, “[i]t was also likely that EO was hired on the recommendation of …[BHG] 
…[which] had operations in Sierra Leone.  The government could not afford to pay EO’s 
startup fee, so [BHG’s owner, Anthony Buckingham] agreed to bankroll the operation in 
exchange for future diamond mining concessions in the Kono region.”10
After nine months of battle, EO pushed the RUF forces back into the jungle.  The 
leader of the RUF  “conceded that, had EO not intervened, he would have taken Freetown 
and won the war.” 11  Peace agreements commenced with one of the demands being that 
the EO leave Sierra Leone.  Subsequently, a general election was held where the Sierra 
Leone People’s Party (SLPP) was the victor. 
For this part of the war, “[t]he cash contract for EO from May to December 1995 
was US$13.5 million.  Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, [SLPP’s leader], convinced that EO’s exit 
would definitely spell his demise, hurriedly renewed the latter’s contract from April 1996 
for 20 more months at a fee of US$35.2 million.”12 In January 1997, President Kabbah 
                                                 
9 Singer, 112 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., 114. 
12 Abdel-Fatau Musah, 91. 
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ended the EO contract early.13   Three months after EO’s withdrawal, the RUF staged a 
coup. In urgent need of money, Kabbah found an investor in a banker from Thailand, 
Rakesh Saxena.  Many of these wars are financed by people or organizations to make a 
profit, and in Sierra Leone’s case, typically, a cut of the diamond action.  This allowed  
Kabbah to hire the PMC Sandline International.  “It is unclear why EO was not brought 
back in, …. however, the same stock holders of the [BHG]/ SRC/ [EO] consortium stood 
to benefit.”14 Like their predecessor, Sandline helped to regain control of  Sierra Leone 
but that edge was lost when they left.15
Sierra Leone has yet to recover.  The fighting continued on until the RUF 
collapsed under the combined pressure of a rebuilt Sierra Leone Army, incursions by the 
Guinean army, and a revitalized UN force.  Elections were finally held again in 2002. “In 
the interim, however, roughly 10,000 civilians were killed by the same RUF organization 
that the [PMCs] had once defeated in a quick and easy fashion.”16  Some believe that “the 
presence of external actors, who were able to sell their military wares to the warring 
factions, was one of the main stumbling blocks in forwarding the peace process.”17
                                                 
13 The ensuing years of the corruption and wars resulted in solidifying Sierra Leone as a 
failed state. Even though it boasts some of the richest resources in the world, the 
government could not afford to pay EO. 
14 Singer, 115. 
15 Also, due to the company’s arms shipments, the British government was found to have 
been complicit in violating the United Nations (UN) arms embargo.  The arms embargo 
is binding under the UN charter and additionally, many regions have domestic arms 
regulations that businesses, such as PMCs, must abide by, however, there are ways to 
circumvent these laws. 
16 Singer,115. 
17 Duncan Campbell, “Marketing the New ‘Dogs of War’,” The Irish National Caucus, 
October 30, 2002. 
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However, Brigadier Julius Maada, a Sierra Leone soldier fighting with EO said: 
“EO ‘did a positive job….We didn’t consider them as mercenaries but as people bringing 
in some sanity.’”18  In her article, “Mercenaries,” Elizabeth Rubin writes: 
Depending on how you tally the gains for Sierra Leone, …. 
EO’s intervention allowed over 300,000 refugees to return 
home.  To keep the same number of people in squalid 
refugee camps in neighboring Guinea was costing the 
international community about $60 million a year.  
Furthermore, the civilians trusted EO much more than 
they’d ever trust their own unreliable soldiers to keep order.  
On the other hand, the new civilian government owed 
millions to a company of …mercenaries and was wholly 
dependent upon them to stay in power.  As it turns out, the 
World Bank ordered the bankrupt civilian government to 
terminate their contract with EO. With no reliable national 
army or peacekeeping force, the country slid back into 
violent disarray. 19
Iraq 
The creation of Iraq was the result of imperialism.  After Iraq won its 
independence from Britain, it experienced a period of instability.  In 1968, the Baa’th 
rose to power. With this party’s emergence came the ascension of the dictator, Saddam 
Hussein.  Iraq experienced years of war under his rule.  For eight years they battled the 
Iranians, which plummeted Iraq into severe debt.  These arrears seemed to have led 
Hussein to become exceedingly outspoken on the subjects of nationalized oil, the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the Gulf States’ elite 
families and Arab nationalism.  Hussein accused his neighbor, Kuwait (to which, with the 
Saudi Arabians, Iraq owed 60 billion dollars) of siphoning oil from a shared oil field. 
                                                 
18 Francis, 329. 
19 Elizabeth Rubin, “Mercenaries,” Crimes of War, http://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/ 
mercenaries.html. 
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Hussein was also forthright about the Palestinians’ right to a nation.  Increasingly, the 
Western powers, Israel and the elites of the Arab governments became uncomfortable.   
Hussein attacked and seized Kuwait in August 1990.  The UN passed a resolution calling 
for trade embargoes on Iraq and Kuwait until Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait.  Iraq 
ignored the UN decree which resulted in a war between Iraq and the United States-led 
coalition forces (Operation Desert Storm).  The allied forces pushed Iraq out of Kuwait 
shortly after the war began. Nonetheless, the war’s consequential destruction was 
insurmountable. 
On April 3, 1991, Iraq agreed to the UN resolution 687 which called for the 
destruction of all its chemical and biological weapons, UN inspections of military 
weapons factories and facilities, reparations to Kuwait and trade sanctions (including oil).  
These trade restrictions would be gradually lifted once all of the weapons were 
relinquished.  At first, the Iraqis did not comply with the inspections but eventually they 
begrudgingly submitted.  However, the UN did not entirely loosen the sanctions.  These 
embargoes further destabilized an already fragile state. 
During the Clinton administration, the United States and Britain annoyed Hussein 
by flying over “no-fly” zones.  In 1998, after the Iraqis accused the UN inspectors of 
spying for the United States and deported UN inspectors from its country, the United 
States Congress passed the “Iraq Liberation Act,” which called for the ousting of 
Hussein.  Post 9/11, the United States began making claims tying Iraq to al Qaeda.  In 
2002, the United States further accused Iraq of hiding weapons of mass destruction and 
persuaded the UN to pass Resolution 1441, which demanded that the weapons 
inspections recommence (no weapons of mass destruction were ever found).  Discounting 
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the UN resolution process, the United States proceeded to enact the Joint Resolution to 
Authorize the use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq.  They began to pressure 
the UN to authorize a “preemptive” invasion on Iraq.  Having failed in that, the United 
States gave the Hussein family one last ultimatum: 48 hours to capitulate. 
On March 18, 2003, the United States and its allies attacked Iraq.  The war 
(Operation Iraqi Freedom) officially ended on May 1, 2003; however, as of 2011  troops 
remain in Iraq 20 as well as in the post 9/11 war’s other theatre, Afghanistan.  The Obama 
administration’s new mission in Iraq is called Operation New Dawn (February 2010) and 
according to Stroud, 
[T]he remaining 50,000 U.S. troops will no longer be 
fighting, but are instead entrusted with training, advising 
and assisting our Iraq brethren to run their own security… 
We also leave behind [the] world’s largest embassy filled 
to the brim with non-military contractors and diplomats.  
The $592 million embassy with operating costs of 
$1.2.billion a year, occupies 104 acres, ….will be 
populated by 5,000 diplomats and 7,000 [PMCs] and 
military troops. ….In short, it does not sound like we’re 
leaving any time soon.21
This off-shoot of the war is “Operation New Dawn” where some United States coalition 
troops remain with brigades of PMCs.22
                                                 
20 As of writing this paper, approximately109,143 people have died, 80% of these deaths 
are estimated as civilian. April 5, 2011, Iraq Body Count, http://www.iraqbodycount. 
org/analysis/numbers/warlogs/. 
21 Kandie Stroud, “The End of the Iraq War or the Continuation?,” The Huffington Post, 
September 16, 2010. 
22 The fundamental concept is tantamount to Joe Torrey, the New York World Series 
winning Yankee manager’s ploy in bringing in Mariano Rivera in the 9th inning: bringing 
in a fresh pitcher to finish the job.  “It makes sense for the military not to keep its force at 
peak capacity, as to do so would build costly redundancies into the system.”  Paul R. 
Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty, Why the Privatization of Government Functions 
40 
One of the unusual components of this war is the enormous numbers of PMCs. 
There are over 196,000 PMCs in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Iraq hosts thousands of PMCs 
which provide security for diplomats, feed the troops and construct buildings. According 
to one report, 
From 2003 through 2007, U.S. government agencies 
awarded $85 billion in contracts for work to be principally 
performed in the Iraq theat[re].  This amount accounts for 
almost 20 percent of the $144 billion in funding for 
activities in Iraq from 2003 to 2007. Of the $85 billion 
awarded in [US] contracts, 70 percent of those awards were 
for contracts performed in Iraq itself.  The three leading 
[US] agencies that made contract awards are the 
Department of Defense (DoD), the [US] Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the Department of 
State (DoS).  The DoD awarded the majority of contracts 
totaling $76 billion, while USAID and DoS obligated $5 
billion and $4 billion, respectively, over the same period. 23
As with any soldier while serving, the entry into war has provided employees of PMCs 
and their families with provisions, such as an income, as well as hardships.   As of 2007, 
the United States Department of Labor had 1,292 contractors listed as being killed, with 
9,610 as injured.  The Pentagon’s figures were 3,954 dead.24  Statistically, these are the 
second highest causalities; the contractors suffered more causalities than “all coalition 
forces combined and more than any single [US] Army division.”25  Like the United 
States soldiers who lacked the necessary equipment due to cost cutting, the PMCs were 
                                                                                                                                                 
Threatens Democracy and What We Can do About it (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), 26. 
23 Kristen A. Huskey and Scott M. Sullivan, “The American Way: Private Military 
Contractors and U.S. War after 9/11,” The Priv-War Report, University of Texas Law 
School, April 30, 2009, 7. 
 
24 Ibid., 6 
25 Ibid. 
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also ill prepared.  PMCs have been criticized as being solely for profit organizations, 
where the owners and the shareholder make the money while the employers skimp on life 
saving equipment for the contractors.  As will be discussed in the concluding remarks, 
statistics also show that many contractors are third world nationals, therefore racism as 
well as classism may come into play.  In terms of the lack of equipment, for example, in 
Fallujah Iraq, on March 31, 2004, four PMC Blackwater contractors were trapped and 
killed.  The lack of equipment was allegedly one of the root causes of their deaths.26  
Their bodies were burned, butchered and strung up on bridge.  The families filed a law 
suit against Blackwater: 
[Quoting the lawyer who filed the suit, Daniel Callahan, 
from the law firm of Callahan & Blaine]“What we have 
right now is something worse than the wild, wild west 
going on in Iraq.… Blackwater is able to operate over there 
in Iraq free from any oversight that would typically exist in 
a civilized society.  As we expose Blackwater in this case, 
it will also expose the inefficient and corrupt system that 
exits over there”. The suit alleged that the men “would be 
alive today” had Blackwater nor sent them unprepared on 
that fateful mission….“[F]our Americans found themselves 
located in a high-risk, war-torn city of Fallujah without 
armored vehicles, automatic weapons, and fewer than 
minimum number of team members was no accident.... 
Instead, this team was sent out without the required 
equipment and personnel by those in charge at 
Blackwater.”27
Blackwater settled with the contractors’ families out of court.  On September 16, 2007, 
the same company’s employees shot and killed 17 civilians in an unprovoked shoot-out 
in Nisour Square.  A lawsuit filed against the contractors was recently dismissed citing 
                                                 
26 Scahill, 215 and 219. 
27 Ibid., 223 
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the United States Constitution’s 5th Amendment (the PMC’s personal statements made to 
the State Department were used as evidence). 
These two incidents are probably the most commonly cited examples of the 
problems of using contractors in this war. As previously stated, the lack of regulations 
concerning these businesses have led not just to situations of violence against civilians, 
soldiers or the contractors themselves, but to more “petty” crimes such as theft or 
embezzling.  PMCs have been criticized for being involved in an exorbitant amount of 
corruption and greed.  For instance, the PMC Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR), a 
subsidiary of Halliburton,28 was hired to participate in most aspects of this war.  They 
have been accused of over charging the government to the tune of millions of dollars.29  
Additionally, many point to the lack of competition for government contracts; a 
substantial number has been awarded to KBR or solely to PMCs whose countries 
supported the United States led-coalition’s war: 
“38 percent of federal contract dollars were awarded in 
2005 without full and open competition,”30…[o]pen ended 
contracts are the rule in Iraq. …Some contracts have been 
cost-effective, but there are those that claim outsourcing 
actually increases [the Department of Defense’s] 
expenditures. Currently over fifty contracts are being 
challenged by congressional overseers, who ask why, 
“instead of competition, the Administration has awarded 
monopoly cost-plus contracts to favored contractors like 
                                                 
28 Kellogg, Brown & Root (known as Brown & Root at the time) was also contracted to 
take part in Operation Desert Storm. 
29 Glenn Minnis, “Halliburton: $61M Overcharge?”  CBS News, December 12, 2003, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/12/12/politics/main588216.shtml.  (In the United 
States, 57 percent of federal spending is allotted to military expenditures). 
30 Verkuil, 147-148 (quoting Congressman Henry Waxman, Comm. on Governmental 
Reform, Min., Staff, Special Investigations Div., “Dollars, Not Sense: Gov. Contracts 
Under the Bush Administration,” June 2006, discussion, n..2). 
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Halliburton” [quoting Waste Fraud and Abuse in US Gov. 
Contracting in Iraq, Comm. Hearing 109th Cong. (2005)].  
There is little doubt that contracts permit or encourage 
fraud and abuse.  Incompletely negotiated agreements can 
undermine the purpose of the contracting function.  They 
are temptations in themselves, and they also lead to 
legitimate misunderstandings between contractor and 
government that take years to resolve. Iraq is an 
environment where, in the words of one experienced 
observer, it is often hard to tell whether the contractors are 
patriots or crooks, or perhaps “crooked patriots.”31
Conclusion 
Angola, Sierra Leone and Iraq are typical examples of the wars that attract PMCs.  
All of these countries were fragile states with failed institutions, mounting economic 
costs from years of wars fought during post colonialism and post imperialism and lands 
containing a plethora of mineral wealth.  These scenarios also have led others to promote 
regime changes.  In 2002, both George Bush and Tony Blair called for regime change in 
Iraq.  The effort to promote change is also alluring to PMCs: “the rasion d’etre and 
modus vivendi of mercenaries is instability, and it is in their interest that a perpetual state 
of instability is maintained….[PMCs] [were] the surrogate state security apparatus.  The 
so-called security and coercive stability provided was largely geared towards securing 
and protecting the economic exploitation of the conflict.”32  Others “argue in favor of 
privatization of security…mainly because of the strategic impact of mercenaries and the 
inability of the collapsed states to provide the most basic security needs for [the] 
citizens.”33
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33 Ibid., 329. 
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The pros of the PMCs in these case studies are that initially they accomplish the 
short term task of pushing back the resistant forces.  However, as we have seen in Angola 
and Sierra Leone, the cons of the PMCs presence might be that in the long run they 
exacerbated the conflicts by not completely shutting the warring factions down.  They 
also contributed to further weakening frail countries by negotiating for some of the 
nation’s mineral wealth as payment.  Additionally, in Iraq, where the freelance security’s 
presence is very much felt, there have been many alleged crimes and human rights 
violations committed by PMCs.  Some incidents, like the Nisour Square shootings in 
2007, occurred simply because of a third party’s involvement in addition to the 
inadequate training of all the factions.   Moreover, there is no definitive avenue of 
recourse for the victims of their supposed injustices.  Another con concerning the PMCs 
as witnessed in Iraq, is their contribution to breaching a nation’s right to sovereignty.  
With the United States-led forces, the PMCs are accomplices in the infringement of a 
nation’s right to sovereignty.  A PMCs ultimate goal is to make money, therefore, unlike 
permanent armed forces, they do not enter a conflict for reasons of defense, injustice or 
loyalty.  In the case of Iraq, the war may have reached the ten year mark because the 
proliferation of PMCs made enacting a draft unnecessary.  In the past, military 
conscriptions, and their subsequent casualties, typically were the reasons why civilians 
would eventually demand that a war end. 
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Chapter 5 
Domestic Laws  
There are few regulations and regulatory bodies that cover military contractors 
where they reside.  The international community has issued its vague decrees which have 
also resulted in the military service providers being lackadaisical about obeying the 
existing rules.  One of the main reasons for this is the complicated manner in which the 
Private Military Corporations (PMCs) are hired.  Typically there is no linear route; it is 
one contractor who was hired by another and so on, and possibly a governmental 
department may be found at the end of that road.  If no government agency is involved, 
then there are even fewer requirements that the military contracting industry must follow. 
If the United States (US) government wants to procure a PMC to fill a post, then 
the request must go through the Office of Management and Budget.  Once approved, 
various departments such as the Department of Defense (DOD) or the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency begin the “contract bidding.” However there is very little real 
competition.  It is not the best company or offer that out bids its competitors. “Less than 
perfect competition in the market for military services makes this problem even more 
severe.  Moreover, many contractors are relatively long-term, including lifetime support 
contractors. …These contracts create an essential monopoly once signed, even if 
competitively bid.”1  For example, Halliburton and its subsidiary Kellogg Brown & Root 
(KBR), have been infamous in over charging the American government during the recent 
                                                 
1 P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors, The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Cornell 
University Press: New York 2002), 155. 
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Iraq and Afghanistan wars.2  Nonetheless, if a PMC is hired by the DOD, it must comply 
with the Defense Acquisition Regulation Supplement which oversees all facets of 
contract enforcement.  
In the early years of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars there were very few policies 
that the PMCs from the United States had to respect.  Until 2008, the military outworkers 
had immunity under the Coalition Provisional Authority 17 (CPA 17): 
CPA 17 had provided a general grant of immunity to 
contractors and outlined the basic parameters in which such 
immunity would not attach or otherwise be made 
inapplicable.  The general grant of immunity provided that:  
“Contractors shall be immune from Iraqi legal process with 
respect to acts performed by them pursuant to the terms and 
conditions of a Contract or any sub-contract thereto.” 
However: 
CPA 17 also established a waiver provision, which 
provided that a grant of  general contractor immunity “is 
not for the individuals concerned” and “may be waived” by 
the United States, and thus, opened the possibility of a local 
trial for contractors accused of unlawful activity.3
After the CPA was compiled, the Private Security Company Association of Iraq 
(PSCAI) was founded.  According to its website, it boasts twenty members, many of 
which are from the United Kingdom while approximately two are Iraqi owned (the 
Babylon Eagles/ TigerSwan, has  Iraq proprietors but they are trained by veterans of the 
                                                 
2 Glenn Minnis, “Halliburton: $61M Overcharge?” CBS News, December 12, 2003, 
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United States Army’s Delta Force4) and a few others are from the Middle East area.5  
Basically the PSCAI is the liaison between the PMCs and the Iraq government, with the 
CPA 17 as its guideline. 
In 2008 a Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) was passed which authorizes Iraq to 
prosecute military outworkers if necessary (PMCs still have immunity status in 
Afghanistan).  Conversely, the military’s Universal Code of Justice’s (UCMJ) 
jurisdiction does not include the PMCs, making them exempt from being court-martialed. 
When Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) was first issued (2000), it only 
included civilians that were hired by the DOD. 
The events at Abu Ghraib led to a revision of MEJA 2000 
in an attempt to close the above mentioned jurisdictional 
gaps. …Because some of the people involved in Abu 
Ghraib were civilian contractors working for departments 
other than the DOD, such as the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) and the Department of the Interior, they 
could not be prosecuted under MEJA 2000. …To address 
the gap, Congress passed an Act amending MEJA 2000 “to 
extend its jurisdictional coverage to employees and 
contractors of other federal agencies,” including 
“employees and contractors of ‘any provisional 
authority.”…Unfortunately, jurisdiction was limited to 
those engaged in employment related to the support of a 
“mission” of the DOD.6
Due to a DOD Authorization Act of Congress, a revised MEJA was passed in 2004.  This 
extended the Act to include all contractors who not only work for the DOD but also those 
                                                 
4 Babylon Eagles/ TigerSwan, http://www.bets-iraq.com/. 
5 Private Security Company Association of Iraq, http://www.pscai.org/pscmembers.html. 
6 Thomas B. Harvey, “Wrapping Themselves in the American Flag:  The Alien Tort 
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who hold positions ‘“to the extent such employment relates to supporting the mission of 
the Department of Defense.’...This includes aggravated assault, theft, unlawful killing, 
sexual abuse and other serious crimes.” 7  After the well documented Blackwater 
shooting in Nisour Square in 2007, the House edited MEJA again to include work done:  
“while employed under a contract (or subcontract at any tier) awarded by any department 
or agency of the United States, where the work under such contract is carried out in an 
area, or in close proximity to an area (as designated by the Department of Defense), 
where the Armed Forces is conducting a contingency operation.”8  This version is 
deceptive because it seems to be more inclusive by including all contractors hired by the 
United States working overseas, but the freelancers need to be in a locale (selected by the 
DOD) near the Armed Forces.  Of course this will exclude many PMCs.  Moreover, only 
crimes that carry a penalty of more than a year can be investigated, which does not 
include low level assaults such as slapping a detainee or causing mental abuse during 
interrogations.9
There are other policies which PMCs must follow, such as the policy that if a 
contract is over $50 million, the corporation must notify the Congress, but as stated 
previously, there are ways to avoid this by, for example, receiving the money in smaller 
increments.  There are weapons regulations such as The United States Arms Export 
Control Act, whose regulatory body is the International Transfer of Arms Regulations, 
                                                 
7 Huskey and Sullivan, 21 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3267). 
8 Harvey, 260. 
9 Huskey and Sullivan, 22. 
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which grants licenses to those that meet the standards. There have been incidents where, 
to avoid disclosing arms transference, weapons are acquired in other countries: 
In February 1998, the British private military company 
Sandline International shipped weapons from Bulgaria 
through Nigeria to Sierra Leone, in violation of an existing 
regional embargo. The Bulgarian government issued a 
denial of complicity, saying that the arms were sold to 
Nigeria for use by that nation’s armed forces. The truth 
may never be established, but arms dealers based in one 
country can often avoid national controls and export 
restrictions by buying weapons in a second country for 
delivery in a third country.10
According to the United States Operational Law Handbook, PMCs contracted to act in a 
“life saving” (what some contractors refer to as personal security on their websites) 
context, where the use of force can possibly occur, are permitted to carry arms only after 
being approved.11
In order to “clean up” the security industries’ image, the International Stability 
Operations Association (ISOA), formerly known as the International Peace Operations 
Association, was founded.  Its PMC members agreed to abide by all of the existing 
international human rights doctrines, including the Montreux document, an initiative by 
the Red Cross and Switzerland to resolve the issues with military contractors (discussed 
later).  Their list of members does not include many of the main players in the current 
theatres such as KBR or XE Services (formerly known as Blackwater).  In 2007, XE 
Services withdrew from ISOA after they heard of their impending removal subsequent to 
the September 16th shooting in Nisour Square.  Apparently ISOA was pressured by their 
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11 Huskey and Sullivan, 17. 
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member DynCorp whose employees were complicit in sex trafficking and rape during the 
United Nations peace keeping mission in Bosnia.12  DynCorp only fired the accused 
employees, including the whistleblowers,13 and ISOA retained the firm as members.14  In 
November 2010, fifty-eight security providers signed onto the Code of Conduct which 
pledges that they will respect all human rights laws and rules of law in conflict zones.15
There are some laws in the US under which a security provider may be 
adjudicated.  For instance, the War Crimes Act (passed in 1996 by President Bill Clinton) 
states that any United States national or a member of its armed forces can be tried for a 
war crime as defined under the Geneva conventions, with the punishment of death. 
Nevertheless, this act may not be applied in relation to a freelance military provider 
because such flagrant crimes rarely happen and if found guilty, then the United States 
would be linked with war crimes.16  Additionally, the Special Maritime Territorial 
Jurisdiction includes nationals and military that committed a crime or were victims of an 
offense on a United States military base. Needless to say, this authority does not include 
foreign contractors17 who make-up a large proportion of the PMC population.  A military 
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corporation can also be criminally liable for crimes committed by its personnel or the 
rehiring of a person who engaged in illegal conduct under the jurisdiction of Corporate 
Criminal Liability. 
Most military corporations do not have strict hiring protocols.  There are no 
regulations concerning background checks (during the vetting phase).  The only “check” 
being made is if a PMC contractor is requesting permission to have a gun abroad.  As the 
Iraq and Afghanistan wars have continued, and incidents that involved PMCs surfaced, 
the security companies are becoming more cognizant and diligent about employee 
screening.  However, that may be all hyperbole.  In IPOA Smackdown: DynCorp vs. 
Blackwater article, the CEO of DynCorp spoke at length about how strict they are in their 
hiring process and that there is zero tolerance for any alcohol consumption. 18  However, 
many of these contractors are veterans who most likely have post traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD). The PMCs do not provide insurance; instead, in the United States, they 
are covered through the Defense Base Act.  For example, here is a case in Iraq: 
Danny Fitzsimons, who worked for the British private 
security firm Armor Group, and who shot dead two 
colleagues after a drinking session in Baghdad’s Green 
Zone in August 2009, is said to be suffering from PTSD. 
He was reportedly diagnosed in January 2004 as suffering 
from PTSD, while still in the British army. Assessments by 
consultant psychiatrists in May 2008 and June 2009 
reported that the symptoms had worsened. Despite this, he 
was hired in August 2009 by ArmorGroup and sent out to 
Iraq without undergoing a full medical assessment. Within 
36 hours of his arrival, the incident took place in which two 
colleagues died and an Iraqi was injured… 
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Consider [ISOA], a major trade association for private 
military contractors. Section 6.2 of its Code of Conduct 
states: 
“Signatories shall ensure that their personnel are medically 
fit and are appropriately screened for the physical and 
mental requirements for their duties according to the terms 
of their contract.” 
Armor Group, which employed Danny Fitzgerald, is an 
[ISOA] member company. Yet it obviously failed to ensure 
he met the mental requirements for the job. 19
The article continues to state that some security freelance organizations such as DynCorp 
and XE Services are addressing the discrepancy by providing adequate health care.20
Domestic Laws with International Applicability 
One of the ways in which the US legal community and the international legal field 
have been attempting to force regulations on the PMCs is through the American court 
system and the use of the Alien Torts Statute (ATS).  In 1789 the Alien Torts Claims Act 
(now more commonly referred to as the Alien Torts Statute) was included in the United 
States First Congresses’ Judiciary Act.  The ATS states that United States Federal district 
courts have the “‘original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.’”21  Even 
though this act was originally intended to deal with dilemmas involving piracy and 
diplomats, for the past three decades it has been cited in numerous human and 
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environmental rights cases.  Since it was first resurrected two hundred years later, the 
debate has continued over Congress’ intention in drawing up this act:  was it to be simply 
limited to piracy and diplomatic quandaries or to “laws of nations” in the future?  Albeit 
the dispute remains, the ATS has matured to fill a void in the international legal system 
that the international, and other domestic courts, leave unaddressed. 
The first ATS case that set the stage for an array of other human rights lawsuits to 
be filed was Filartiga v. Pena-Irala (1980). This case was filed by a doctor whose son 
was beaten to death by a police officer in Paraguay. All of the parties were citizens of 
Paraguay. On the basis of the seldom utilized ATS, the case eventually made its way to 
the Second Circuit court of appeals where the court opined: 
Upon ratification of the Constitution, the thirteen former 
colonies were fused into a single nation, one which, in its 
relations with foreign states, is bound both to observe and 
construe the accepted norms of international law, formerly 
known as the law of nations... 
Construing this rarely-invoked provision, we hold that 
deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official 
authority violates universally accepted norms of the 
international law of human rights, regardless of the 
nationality of the parties.22
Filartiga’s importance was the court’s jurisdictional acceptance of such lawsuits:  “The 
Filartiga case was brought under the Alien Torts [Statute] ... and established that the 
[US] courts had jurisdiction over non-criminal abuses that occurred anywhere in the 
world, ‘so long as the alleged wrong would violate international law.’”23
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A complaint filed against Radovan Karadzic (Kadic v. Karadzic), the President of 
the self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb republic of “Srpska,” by the victims of the Bosnian-
Herzegovina War further advanced the ATS.24 Kadic set a precedent in that the court 
ruled that non-state actors, individuals, as well as corporations, can be sued for breaches 
of international laws.  The Second Circuit ruled that first: 
[S]ome international law norms apply equally to private 
actors and to government officials. …Second, Kadic 
recognized that a private person can be held liable for an 
international violation that does require state action in 
complicity with a state actor.  These holdings make clear 
that a private corporation can be held liable under the 
[ATS] when it engages in one of the core international 
violations that do not require state action such as, genocide 
or slavery, or when it acts in complicity with a state actor 
committing any of the core violations.25
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004) was another model court case primarily because 
it reached the Supreme Court level where the court reversed a lower court ruling in which 
a Mexican citizen was abducted by Mexican Nationals hired by the United States Drug 
Enforcement Agency.  The court concluded that this kidnapping, and the resulting 
detainment, was not a breach of the laws of nations.  Furthermore, the court decided that 
debates over claims like the ATS should be more defined by the legislative body.  The 
court did not however reverse Filartiga but Stephens states: 
[I]t’s possible to see the Court’s opinion as a glass only half 
full.  [T]he Court stopped well short of foreclosing the use 
of the ATS to bring suits alleging violations of international 
law in federal courts without Congress’s explicit okay.  To 
the contrary, rather than shut the door on “independent 
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judicial recognition of actionable international norms,” 
[the] majorit[ies’] opinion explicitly keeps the door “ajar” 
to future suits, albeit “subject to vigilant doorkeeping” by 
the federal courts.  As explained by Hofstra University 
School of Law professor Julian Ku, Souter’s opinion 
“makes all the right noises about the dangers of 
unrestrained federal court international lawmaking, but it 
didn’t take that final step that would have restricted it in 
any meaningful way.” The Souter opinion acknowledges 
that “a decision to create a private right of action is one 
better left to legislative judgment in the great majority of 
cases,” yet allows federal judges to retain the discretion to 
recognize such causes of action themselves.  In other 
words, federal courts may recognize novel causes of action 
alleging violations of international law absent 
congressional authorization in some limited, and undefined, 
set of cases.  As Justice Scalia observed, by holding this 
door open for judges to “create rights where Congress has 
not authorized them to do so, the Court countenances 
judicial occupation of a domain that belongs to the people’s 
representatives.”  Insofar as judges base such rights on 
international law, particularly on customary international-
law norms or unratified treaties, they risk undermining the 
constitutional premise that all laws derive their legitimacy 
from the governed.  While the spirit of Souter’s opinion is 
quite restrictive, there is little doubt that some lower courts 
- and many academics -will see the opinion as a green light 
to keep trying to bring ATS claims for all sorts of alleged 
international injustices.26
Sosa is the controlling law of the land as it is the only ATS case thus far to be 
dealt with in the Supreme Court.  One of the main commonalities of the ATS and PMCs 
are the disputes over characterizations and legal ambiguities.  Both concepts are fairly 
new, so many concepts have yet to be defined and solidified.  Many legal experts contend 
that because the ATS is involved with “laws of nations,” then it only encompasses states, 
not individuals or other non-state actors.  The Kadic opinion addressed the quandary of 
individuals, as well as corporations: “From it’s incorporation into international law, the 
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proscription of genocide has applied equally to state and non-state actors.”27  However 
recently in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company the majority decided that 
corporations can not be held for violations of laws of nations.  The minority refuted this: 
The majority…cite no authority in support of their assertion 
that a corporation is not a subject of international law and is 
therefore incapable of being a plaintiff or a defendant in an 
action based on a violation of the law of nations. And there 
is strong authority to the contrary. 
As early as the Nuremberg trials, which represented the 
dawn of the modern enforcement of the humanitarian 
component of the law of nations, courts recognized those 
corporations had obligations under international law (and 
were therefore subjects of international law). In at least 
three of those trials, tribunals found that corporations 
violated the law of nations and imposed judgment on 
individual criminal defendants based on their complicity in 
the corporations’ violations.28
Most ATS advocates cite Sosa, (the controlling law) to argue that the Supreme 
Court would not have written “whether international law extends the scope of liability for 
a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private 
actor such as a corporation or individual,”29 if the court was disputing that the ATS 
jurisdiction could include non-state actors. 
Proponents of the ATS argue that it should have jurisdiction over individuals or 
corporations which have been accused of committing egregious acts that are breaches of 
international edicts such as the Geneva Conventions, the Declaration of Human Rights, 
The European Convention on Human Rights and the Rome Statute of the International 
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Criminal Court.  Additionally advocates of the ATS allude to the more recent Rwandan 
and Yugoslavian Tribunals.  According to Clapham, “the assumption that the crime of 
torture is confined to state officials has now been rebutted [and]…as the Appeals 
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia…has more 
recently confirmed, there is no need for a public official to be involved in order for a 
private individual to be responsible under international law for the international crime of 
torture.”30
Some courts have opined that precedence has been set where a corporation has 
been proven as being complicit in aiding and abetting a state actor.  As in Kiobel, many 
cite the Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals:  the Flick, the 
Farben and the Krupp war crimes tribunals where individuals, who either worked or 
owned corporations, were criminally tried and found guilty of war crimes.  Those that 
refute that corporations can be tried civilly under ATS claims, point to the same trials, 
arguing that the Nuremberg Trials were criminal, not civil and individuals were tried, not 
the corporations. In Kiobel, Judge Leval argues: 
If a corporation harms victims by conduct that violates the 
law of nations, imposition of civil liability on the 
corporation perfectly serves the objectives of civil liability. 
It compensates the victims for the harms wrongly inflicted 
on them and restores to them what is rightfully theirs. What 
is more, in all likelihood, the objectives of civil tort liability 
cannot be achieved unless liability is imposed on the 
corporation. Because the corporation, and not its personnel, 
earned the principal profit from the violation of the rights 
of others, the goal of compensation of the victims likely 
cannot be achieved if they have remedies only against the 
persons who acted on the corporation’s behalf -- even in the 
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unlikely event that the victims could sue those persons in a 
court which grants civil remedies for violations of 
international law. Furthermore, unlike the case with 
corporate criminal liability, which does not exist in many 
nations of the world, it is the worldwide practice to impose 
civil liability on corporations.31
Moreover, the Judge adds that “[w]hile the court [the International Court of Justice (ICJ)] 
does not exercise jurisdiction over private actors, [(Article 34(1) of the ICJ Statute)], its 
precedents involving awards of reparations paid by one state to another demonstrate that 
an award of damages against a juridical entity is familiar ground in international law.”32
There are many other impediments that arise when referencing ATS claims in a 
complaint. The other obstacles are: statute of limitations (ten years), forum non 
conveniens (discussed below), and if the accused is a non-state actor, then aiding and 
abetting must be proven (mentioned below).  Another impediment to ATS claims are 
political questions which includes foreign relations and the United States political 
branches, for instance, if a PMC is employed by the government, then defense may claim 
immunity.   “[E]xclu[ed] from judicial review [are] those controversies which revolve 
around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution 
to Congress or the Executive Branch.”33  In the case of a non-state actor such as a PMC, 
defense can cite amongst other claims already alluded to above, the Federal Torts Claim 
Act (FTCA) which asserts immunity as a state agent: 
The majority held that FTCA preempted all tort suits 
against service contractors “integrated and performing a 
common mission with the military,” in combat zones, 
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because the policy embodied by the combatant activities 
exception is simply the elimination of tort from the 
battlefield. …And the policies of the combatant activities 
exception are equally implicated whether the alleged 
tortfeasor is a soldier or a contractor.34
Private military firms’ attorneys also refer to to the General Contract 
Defense where: 
“uniquely federal interests” [are] at stake and that 
application of state law liability theories presented a 
significant conflict with federal policies or interests.  The 
Supreme Court looked to the discretionary function 
exception in the FTCA, which maintains the government’s 
sovereign immunity for claims based upon the “exercise or 
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal 
agency or employee of the Government, whether or not the 
discretion involved b[e] abused.” [quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§2680(a)].35
Moreover, also cited by plaintiffs in these sorts of lawsuits is the Convention 
Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment which 
“obligates each [s]tate party to ‘ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of 
torture…has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation including the means 
for as full rehabilitation as possible.”’36
Plaintiffs also refer to domestic laws such as statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which 
asserts that a “state can be held responsible for the acts of private parties, private parties 
                                                 
34 Saleh v. Titan Corp., Consolidated Brief for Petitioners, Civ. No. 09-1313, filed on 
July 13, 2010, 14-15. 
35 Huskey and Sullivan, 35. 
36 Kiobel, 621 F.3d  at 171 n.26 (quoting the United Nations Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, June 26, 1987) 
(emphasis in the original). 
60 
can also be held responsible for their acts under [US] law.”37  Cited also is the 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States which declares 
that international law is the supreme law of the United States:38 “the modern view is that 
customary international law in the United States is federal law.”39  Many argue that 
domestic claims such as these should not be permitted when considering international 
norms, and therefore, not what the First Congress intended when creating the ATS. 
Why the lengthy discussion of the ATS when discussing potential regulatory 
processes for the PMCs?  First, thus far it may be the only redress a victim of human 
rights violations committed by a PMC contractor may pursue.  Second, the United States 
is currently the only venue where such a civil tort can occur.  With respect to the 
international platform, the United Nations (UN) judiciary system is comprised of three 
basic entities: the ICJ, the International Criminal Court (ICC) and ad hoc Tribunals.  
There is also the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which is not an official unit of the UN, 
but it is an international forum where a State or person can seek judicial recourse. 
The ICJ only hears actions when the parties are nations. The ICC, as its moniker 
suggests, solely adjudicates criminal cases that involve individuals (sometimes damages 
or trusts are awarded).  The tribunals have thus far been used only to adjudicate those 
believed to be responsible for war crimes. 
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Many may argue that it is apropos that the decision in Kadic has therefore 
extended the ATS’ range to include suits against many multinational conglomerates 
where they are based:  in the United States.  Nonetheless, it is ironic that the corporate 
mecca of the universe is where these torts are filed; the United States legal system is a 
unique venue where these civil cases can be tried, and the victims are awarded large 
sums, thus forcing those culpable to pay compensatory damages.  The primary reason 
why the United States judiciary system permits cases such as those that cite the ATS is 
that “our federal courts assert jurisdiction and apply [US] law as instructed by the 
Constitution and Congress, with no inherent limitations based on the relationship of the 
case to the forum.  [US] federal courts thus have jurisdiction over international human 
rights cases because Congress, through [ATS] and related statutes, has instructed them to 
decide such cases.”40
Since its resurgence, the ATS has filled a necessary void that other regulations are 
not capable of, therefore solidifying the international legal system and decreasing human 
and environmental injustices.  There are many obstacles that an ATS action must 
confront in order for a lawsuit to succeed.  However this is not a negative aspect of this 
type of action; rather this has aided in strengthening international law. 
For instance, in order for an ATS tort to survive, lawyers must prove that the 
jurisdiction where the action is filed is the paramount venue, otherwise the court could 
opine that it is forum non conveniens.  It is rare that an ATS action does not include a 
long forum non conveniens battle.  At first glance this may seem expensive and time 
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consuming; however it actually contributes to developing a sturdy legal argument with an 
emphasis on international law, decreases frivolous lawsuits and reinforces a respect for 
sovereignty.  Short notes that: 
Forum non conveniens, like the political question doctrine, 
the Act of State doctrine, and the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act, serves an important gatekeeper function to 
ensure that only appropriate cases are heard by the federal 
courts, regardless of the nature of the substantive claim 
issue.  Forum non conveniens, allows federal judges to 
avoid the inconveniences and difficulties associated with 
adjudicating a dispute with attenuated connections to the 
United States if an adequate alternative forum exists 
outside the United States and relevant interest factors 
support dismissal… 
Forum non conveniens serves a further gatekeeping role by 
helping to ensure, along with other jurisdictional doctrines 
mentioned above, that domestic litigation does not 
unnecessarily disrupt [US] foreign policy.  Because ATS 
suits require a [US] court to sit in judgment of claims that 
often involve significant foreign governmental elements, 
they result in an increased likelihood of straining 
international relations....[F]orum non conveniens allows 
judges to exclude ... sensitive suits with overriding foreign 
components, thereby reducing the risk of disrupting 
international relations.41  
An ATS action must also prove that “laws of nations” have been breached. As 
stated previously, the ATS suit Filartiga permitted such an action to be heard in United 
States Federal courts and (although currently debated) supported the view that what the 
founding fathers referred to as the “law of nations” would be today’s “customary 
international laws.”  Customary international laws are not codified, but are peremptory 
norms (jus cogens).  In order for such a law to become a “norm,” it has to be established 
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by the global community as a norm from which no derogation is permitted.  Examples of 
international norms are those against slavery, genocide, war of aggression, and crimes 
against humanity  The problem arises when trying to prove that a human or 
environmental violation on a “smaller,” less systematic scale is jus cogens.  Most of these 
ATS cases rely on documents such as the Geneva Conventions, the Nuremberg Trials, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, 
American Convention on Human Rights and the UN Charter where jus cogens are 
defined as egregious acts committed on a grand scale.  Even though, “[h]uman rights are 
undergoing a stage of continuing evolution.  Through a process of accretion, in which the 
repetition of the articulation and the assertion of certain norms in various resolutions and 
declarations and treaties play[] an important role, elements of state practice and opinio 
juris [an opinion of law or necessity] form new customary norms of human rights.”42  
The human rights laws have yet to evolve and include the less immense crimes. 
Another dilemma is the difficulty of demonstrating that the defendant 
intentionally violated international norms.  This has become a major issue when suing 
multinational corporations for breaches of human rights or environmental laws.  It is 
extremely difficult to prove without significant evidence that a corporation based in 
California had the knowledge of what its subsidiary in Nigeria was sanctioning.  For 
instance, in a recent decision in the case Bowoto v. Chevron, the jury decided in favor of 
the defendants.  The action involved Chevron’s sister auxiliary in Nigeria and a group of 
protesters who were challenging the companies’ appalling environmental and labor 
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infringements.  To ward off the demonstrators, Chevron’s subsidiary hired Nigerian 
military, and: 
[a]ccording to testimony, military personnel began shooting 
before their helicopters landed on the platform.  Two 
protesters were killed and others were wounded.  Many of 
the protesters were taken into custody and, according to 
court filings relating their trial testimony, were tortured and 
told they would be killed.  These broad facts were never in 
dispute. Rather, the case turned on whether Chevron’s 
Nigeria subsidiary...could be held liable....  The jury 
handed up a verdict that only the Nigerian Military, not 
Chevron or its affiliates, was responsible for the 
[mayhem].... Chevron said “It was never [the Companies’] 
intent that anyone on the platform be harmed, and we 
deeply regret the loss of life and injuries that occurred.”43
As mentioned previously, during the aftermath of World War II, it was well 
documented that individuals as well as business executives that benefited from crimes 
against humanity are just as culpable as the assailants.44  “[I]nternational criminal 
responsibility of corporate executives as accomplices has long been recognized. …Since 
Nuremberg there has been no question that accomplices, including those who aid and 
abet crimes, are responsible under international criminal law.”45  In 1996, the United 
Nations International Law Commission Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind stated that it “would impose criminal responsibility for genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes (as well as other crimes) on an individual who 
‘knowingly aids, abets or otherwise assists, directly and substantially, in the commission 
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of such a crime, including providing the means for its commission.’”46  Likewise, 
“[l]iability for aiding and abetting...should extend to all instances in which a corporation 
acts ‘in concert with’ a government carrying out a campaign of genocide or war crimes 
against humanity. …A corporation so acts in concert with a government when it provides 
practical assistance with knowledge that the assistance will facilitate perpetration of a 
crime.’”47
Many of these ATS suits that named corporate defendants do not stay the course 
to trial for a variety of reasons (for example, as already stated:  forum non conveniens).  
A modest percentage arrange a settlement.  For instance, an ATS action against Chiquita 
Banana was settled for $25 million. 48  Chiquita admitted to paying approximately $1.7 
million over a fifteen year period to paramilitary groups which had been accused of 
horrendous massacres financed by cocaine exports. 49  Even though a case such as this 
did not go to trial, it attracted much publicity and justice may have been served.  
Additionally, the precedents set by each of these ATS torts are imperative to helping 
shape international law. 
It is not an anomaly that the Alien Torts Statute only exists in the US legal 
system.  Typically in the United States, social change is accomplished through its legal 
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structure. Civil cases have continually been the means by which the United States dealt 
with its societal tribulations.  Unlike other countries, the United States legal system also 
allows law firms and Legal Aid lawyers to take chances by filing pro bono human rights 
cases which may recoup large sums for their fees in the end.  There is also “a vigorous 
network of public interest, nonprofit litigation offices, funded by tax deductible 
donations, that can litigate cases without fee.”50
All of these factors - a legal tradition of impact litigation, 
the structure of attorneys’ fees and the availability of public 
interest litigators, default judgments, and discovery - 
combine to render civil litigation in [US] federal courts an 
attractive option for public interest litigators, as well as 
their private, fee-oriented colleagues.  Combined with 
favorable jurisdictional rules that enable suit against 
individuals transitorily in the country or corporations doing 
business in the United States, the legal system offers a 
uniquely supportive framework for civil lawsuits seeking 
damages for international human rights abuses.51
Other countries do not have such legal structures. Even England’s judicial 
structure, the equivalent to the United States in legal formula, could not support such civil 
lawsuits.  “[These results are not] a product of different views of international law.  
Instead, it is the result of domestic laws that differ in small but crucial details and render 
such litigation unlikely to succeed and financially risky.  It also reflects sharply different 
attitudes toward civil litigation as a tool of legal reform.”52
The damages awarded to the victim in other countries are paltry compared to the 
United States.  In some instances, if the plaintiff loses a suit, he or she has to pay all of 
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the fees. Some cultures find it strange to compensate victims of horrific crimes with 
money.  Conversely, it could be argued that some human rights violations are: 
difficult to explain without reference to economic 
motivations on the part of the dominant group to 
expropriate a foreign or minority population’s land, natural 
resources, property, and uncompensated labor.  These 
economic motivations become especially powerful when 
oil companies hold out the prospect of  generous 
revenues to a regime willing to kill or displace any ethnic 
or religious groups that resist the government’s effort to 
exploit the national wealth in a discriminatory fashion.  
Accordingly, the redistribution of stolen resources and 
wealth to the victim groups should take center stage in 
[human rights violations] prevention.53
The concept of civil torts versus criminal is not even translatable in some 
societies.  Certain societies are not as litigious as the United States.  For example, many 
Asian nations prefer mediation to legal action.  Other states’ courts still: 
reflect… roots in a hierarchal and bureaucratic colonial 
past.  [For example, according to Joseph R. Thome, in 
Latin America] “[t]he judicial system ... was not really 
conceived as an institution to resolve the conflicts of the 
population at large, but rather as a component of the 
administration of [s]tate power, that is, as an instrument of 
social control.”  Despite the social upheaval of the past 
decades, the judiciary often remains a locus of routine 
bureaucratic decision-making…, rather than a forum for 
challenging the abuse of power.54
Nevertheless, in the 2000s, the government of George Bush and numerous 
corporations banded together writing amicus curiae briefs to dissuade various courts 
from ruling in favor of the plaintiffs in ATS cases.  The main reason voiced was that the 
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judicial branch should not be deciding on such a topic: decreasing the executive branch’s 
power.  Moreover, an ATS case may interfere with foreign relations.  For instance, China 
pressured the Bush administration to halt the legal action of Falun Gong Buddhists, 
stating “that the litigation would cause `immeasurable’ harm to relations between the 
United States and China.”55  Others argue that the ATS torts do not respect state 
sovereignty.  Still, as Beth Stephen concludes:  
Similarity ill-founded arguments about judicial 
misinterpretations of the [ATS] and the need to defer to 
executive branch foreign policy decisions have been 
asserted as pretexts to oppose judicial review of the human 
rights abuses of corporations and foreign governments. 
Although the Constitution clearly assigns the executive 
branch the leading role in foreign affairs, it also requires 
that the judicial branch review and decide questions 
properly brought before it. Where the Administration offers 
strained readings of federal statutes and implausible 
predictions about foreign relations, its views are not 
entitled to deference. Indeed, to defer to such views would 
be to permit the current administration to distort the proper 
balance of powers between the executive and judicial 
branches of our government.56
The ATS might not be the best remedy for victims that have endured appalling 
human rights violations, but it does fill an international judicial abyss.  Furthermore, even 
if one may disagree with the ATS statute’s current use, it has forced the global business 
community to take a solemn look at its past partnership with the global community.  
“[ATS] operates on…three levels. …:in the legal venue of the courtroom, in the 
marketplace of public opinion responding to allegations, and in the normative sphere 
where the ever-present threat of [ATS] encourages companies to improve their human 
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rights policies and practices to avoid litigation.  [According to Williams and Conley] 
‘The risks to [a] business[es’] reputation from credible allegations of human rights abuses 
create incentives for companies and directors to consider these issues seriously, 
irrespective of whether an ultimate finding of liability is likely.’”57   
These forms of torts have also educated the public as to the abuses of human 
rights that exist worldwide.  Obviously it is beneficial for individuals to know their rights, 
but as consumers we should know, as in the case of Chiquita, if the banana that we buy is 
grown in soil that is watered by blood. 
Laws of Other Countries 
The United Kingdom (UK) (which is home to the most affluent PMC in the 
world, G4S), has even fewer policies that a security company must follow.  In 2002, the 
Green Paper entitled “Private Military Companies Options for Regulations” was 
compiled by the Rand Europe organization.  This work calls for a ban on the recruitment 
or use of private military abroad, as well as self-regulation in the form of a voluntary 
code of conduct and the establishment of licensing systems.   Moreover the Green Paper 
requests the formulation of an arms trafficking system modeled after the South African 
Arms Control Committee and the United States’ Department of State’s Export Control 
which would oversee International Transfer of Arms Regulations.  The House of 
Commons Foreign Affairs Committee Ninth Report of Session 2001-2002 concurred with 
the Green Paper but stressed more licensing regulations and suggested that to help 
administer these conventions, a distinction be made between combat and non combat 
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activities.58  Additionally, the committee did find that it would be counterproductive to 
urge a ban on the use of private military organizations in as much as the companies 
would simply move to another country.59  In February of 2006, the British Association of 
Private Security Companies (BAPSC) was formed as an approach to self-regulation. 
Although the ISOA is its American contemporary, their position statements are very 
different:  
The purpose of the British Association of Private Security 
Companies (“the Association”) is to promote, enhance and 
regulate the interests and activities of UK-based firms and 
companies that provide armed security services in countries 
outside the UK and to represent the interests and activities 
of Members in matters of proposed or actual legislation. 
In the context of this Charter, the term “Armed Services” is 
defined as any service provided by a Member of the 
Association that involves the recruitment, training, 
equipping, coordination, or employment, directly or 
indirectly of persons who bear lethal arms… 
Provide security designed primarily to deter any potential 
aggressor and to avoid any armed exchange. This concept 
allows the use of weapons to protect clients or security 
personnel in a defensive mode and only where there is no 
other way to defend against an armed attack or to effect 
evacuation.60
Even though the BAPSC does not sugar coat the reality of using weapons they (as does 
ISOA) do state their commitment to the doctrines and laws of human rights.  Most of the 
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BAPSC members are also members of PSCAI, unlike the American based PMCs.  In 
fact, the BAPSC worked with the authors of the Montreux doctrine (discussed later).  The 
BAPSC support the doctrine and urge other British PMCs to be signatories too. 
Apparently many of the British private military firms tried to join the ISOA but were 
rejected. For instance, the contractor Aegis was denied membership due to it employees’ 
behavior but “[n]evertheless, this has not prevented Aegis from being awarded …[a] 
lucrative contract with the Pentagon, which gives the company considerable power and 
influence over the safety and effectiveness of the other [PMCs] including many ISOA 
members thereby undermining the [ISOA] initiative.”61
In 2009, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Public Consultations on PMCs 
submitted its proposals to the United Kingdom government.  They suggested that in 
addition to self-regulation and licensing, there should be compiled a national and a 
international code of conduct akin to the Montreux Doctrine, discussed in the next 
section.  Although its authority is only national, the British do have the Private Security 
Industry Act 2001 that was devised to curb criminality and raise the standards of their 
PMCs.  This is accomplished through two agencies, the Security Industry Authority 
(SIA) and Approved Contractor Scheme (ACS).62  Even though the United Kingdom has 
a vast array of native PMCs, “[t]here is little regulation of the private military and 
security industry in the UK despite the widening scope of application of [PMCs] and 
increasing reliance on the industry by the UK Government.”63
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The British do have some laws that may allow a citizen to seek redress in its 
courts, such as the Human Rights Act of 1998 that covers private companies inflicting 
abuses in detention centers.  A private military firm can also be charged with breaching 
the International Criminal Court Act of 2001 if accused of crimes against humanity.64
As stated above, all PMCs in Iraq and Afghanistan are under the authority of the 
CPA and if necessary, SOFA.  However, the British also have State Immunity Act of 
1978, where, in court, a PMC can claim to have immunity if employed by the sovereign. 
In some cases, British military law can incorporate a contractor too.  Conversely, a 
corporation can be found liable for committing egregious acts under the UK Company 
Law.65
Another European Country that is home to numerous military contractor firms is 
France.  The French did not authorize the Iraq war but are part of the NATO forces in 
Afghanistan.  In 2003 France passed an anti-Mercenary law which reworked the 
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions Article 47 (1977): 
On April 3, 2003, [a] few weeks after the beginning of the 
Iraq war, the French Members of Parliament, across party 
lines voted a new law prohibiting “active mercenary” 
activity.  During the parliamentary debate, French Defense 
minister Michèle Alliot-Marie. …declared:  “Real war 
enterprises, often of Anglo-Saxon origin, have, in this 
context, appeared and fructify.  ‘In hand’ war material is 
delivered by them to failing states and the means to achieve 
their ends is given to oppositions poorly respectful of any 
legal procedures.  One has to note here, by the way, that 
we’re not talking about traditional mercenaries, as 
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individuals, but about real commercial companies, the 
more…fearsome as they [display] …powerful means.” 66
The French also have a law prohibiting private forces from fighting for the state.  
Additionally France has enacted regulations that PMCs within the state must respect too.  
For example, PMCs must obtain authorization from the Inter-ministerial Commission for 
the Study of War Materials Exports if a contract necessitates the use of arms.  By French 
law, private military enterprises can also be charged under Corporate and Labor Law.  
Nonetheless: 
The national framework regulating [PMCs] is insufficient. 
Their status, legitimacy, scope of action and range of 
services is not legally defined. Moreover, French law needs 
to be “polished” by further jurisprudence as thus far only 
one case has been prosecuted pursuant to the 2003 law 
against mercenary activities. It must be underlined too that 
the main purpose of the 2003 law is not to regulate security 
or private military companies.67
Russia is also the host to many PMCs but its regulations are not as organized and 
extensive.  The Private Detective and Security Activities law in Russia states that a 
company that provides protection must, for instance, protect citizens, property and 
provide security consultation.  In January 2010 a new version of this law was passed 
which added the prohibition of the use of any private money in a private security 
operation.68  It is mandatory for a PMC to apply for a license before beginning operations 
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and the contractors are permitted to carry guns. In Russia, there is a strict distinction 
between the state military and private security forces. 
The use of mercenaries in post-colonial Africa was the impetus for most 
international and regional modern conventions discussing soldiers for hire. 
Throughout the twentieth century, the international 
community further curtailed organized private armies.  In 
particular, there was an extraordinary backlash against the 
individual, ad-hoc mercenaries, commonly known as les 
affreux (“the dreaded ones”), who threatened the stability 
of many mineral-rich, post-Colonial African regimes. 
Indeed, during the 1960s and 70s, the governments of 
Zaire, Nigeria, Sudan, Guinea, Angola, Benin, the Comoro 
Islands, and the Seychelles were all seriously threatened by 
such mercenaries who usually hailed from these countries’ 
previous colonial occupiers.  It is largely because of the 
abuses committed by these mercenaries and the significant 
threat they posed to post-Colonial independence that an 
international consensus developed condemning 
mercenarism.69
The African colonies’ struggle for independence from Portugal, and the subsequent 
violence that ensued, prompted the United Nations to pass Resolutions 2395 and 2465.  
Both resolutions recognize the right of the colonial people to self-determination.  The 
Resolutions further condemn the colonial powers and their allies for hiring mercenaries to 
fight against the liberation movements.  These resolutions were fundamental to future 
edicts such as the declarations of Organization of African Unity (OAU) of 1972, 1977 
and 1980 which argue for the overall condemnation of mercenaries in Africa.  The 
preamble of The Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa states that 
mercenaries are the root cause of Africa’s disunity and a continued menace to some 
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African states’ struggles for independence.  However, there were three different versions 
of this convention in which the definition of mercenary was slightly altered.  Due to the 
involvement of mercenaries in the Angolan civil war, the original version was edited and 
the Luanda Draft Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of Mercenaries was 
adopted by the OAU in 1977. 
Considering Africa’s past with mercenaries, the document’s 1980 version defines 
these private soldiers as: 
(a) A mercenary is any person who:  
(b) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed 
conflict; 
(c) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;  
(d) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire 
for private gain and, in fact is promised, by or on behalf of a Party 
to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of 
that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions 
in the armed forces of that Party; 
(e) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of the 
territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;  
(f) is not a member of the regular armed forces of a Party to the 
conflict; and  
(g) has not been sent by a [s]tate which is not a Party to the conflict on 
official duty as a member of its armed forces.70 
The convention then states that it is a crime to be, train, equip or employ a mercenary.  
Furthermore, Article four explains that mercenaries are not lawful soldiers; therefore 
prisoner of war status is not to be extended to them.  In 1998 the South African 
Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act declared that any foreign military aide 
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(without authorization) or mercenarism is illegal and punishable by a fine and/ or 
imprisonment. 71
International Regulations 
There are very few international provisions that address hired contractors that are not part 
of a state’s armed forces.  According to Singer: 
Public military forces have all manner of traditional 
controls over their activities of the military forces and its 
personnel, parliamentary scrutiny, public opinion, and 
numerous aspects of international law.  PM[Cs], however 
are only subject to the laws of the market.  Current 
international law only speaks to the role of individual 
mercenaries of the traditional sort and has been found 
inapplicable to the actions of the industry.  There is also no 
agency or legislative oversight in the way there may be on 
traditional militaries.  Other than its shareholders, there are 
no real checks and balances on the PM[Cs].72
The existing international regulations are ambiguous in their classification of 
mercenaries which allows room for infractions.  As stated previously, in the 1949 Geneva 
Convention mercenaries were not mentioned but listed instead were supply contractors 
that could be interpreted as such if declaring prisoner of war status.  It was not until the 
civil wars of post colonial Africa, and the hiring of mercenaries to fight in these battles, 
that the United Nations felt pressured to pass Resolution 2465 (1968).  Resolution 2465 
states: 
[T]hat the practice of using mercenaries against movements 
for national liberation and independence is punishable as a 
criminal act and that the mercenaries themselves are 
outlaws, and calls upon the Governments of all countries to 
enact legislation declaring the recruitment, financing and 
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training of mercenaries in their territory to be a punishable 
offence and prohibiting their nationals from serving as 
mercenaries.73
The Geneva Convention’s (1977) definition of a mercenary has been criticized for its 
loose characterization.  As stated previously, a mercenary is one who is hired to fight in a 
conflict, whose incentive is financial gain.  This of course does not include all of the 
scenarios that may apply to a mercenary or a PMC contractor.  For example, it is very 
unlikely that a freelance security contractor will be hired to actually fight in a war, 
instead they may be hired to assist its client in some other affiliated manner.   However, 
an individual can not be labeled a mercenary without meeting all of the requirements.  In 
addition, the financial incentive of a contractor, is very difficult to prove.74
In 1989, the International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing 
and Training of Mercenaries was codified.  More definitive then its predecessors, it still 
is not applicable to the corporate military organizations.  It retains the 1977 Geneva 
Convention articles about mercenaries but adds sections concerning prohibiting the 
overthrowing of governments and the financing, recruiting or training of freelance 
soldiers.  This regulation was also passed because of the outcomes of mercenaries 
participating in civil wars in Africa.  In this regulation, there is still a lot of “wiggle” 
room that the PMCs could use in their defense such as refuting that they are contracted to 
“fight in an armed conflict.”  Furthermore, often these incorporated contractors are hired 
in the country in which they are citizens, sometimes under the auspices of assisting in 
                                                 
73 United Nations, General Assembly, Twenty-Third Session, 5, ¶ 8 (December 20. 
1968). 
74 Katherine Fallah, “Corporate Actors: the Legal Status of Mercenaries in Armed 
Conflict,” International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 88, Number 863, September 2006, 
605. 
78 
emergency efforts such as a devastating earthquake.  Although this convention attempts 
to better define a mercenary, it fails to capture all the possible scenarios of such an 
occupation.  Additionally, “there is a problem in policing the [behaviors] of individuals 
engaged in the above activities.”75  Only seventeen countries have signed on to the 1989 
convention. 
In 1987, the United Nations appointed a Special Rapporteur on the use of 
mercenaries.  This evolved into the Working Group (2005) whose mission is to: 
(h) To elaborate and present concrete proposals on possible 
complementary and new standards aimed at filling existing gaps, 
as well as general guidelines or basic principles encouraging the 
further protection of human rights, in particular the right of peoples 
to self-determination, while facing current and emergent threats 
posed by mercenaries or mercenary-related activities;  
(i) To seek opinions and contributions from Governments and 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations on 
questions relating to its mandate; 
(j) To monitor mercenaries and mercenary-related activities in all 
their forms and manifestations in different parts of the world; 
(k) To study and identify sources and causes, emerging issues, 
manifestations and trends regarding mercenaries or mercenary-
related activities and their impact on human rights, particularly on 
the right of peoples to self-determination; 
(l) To monitor and study the effects on the enjoyment of human 
rights, particularly the right of peoples to self-determination, of the 
activities of private companies offering military assistance, 
consultancy and security services on the international market, and 
to prepare a draft of international basic principles that encourage 
respect for human rights by those companies in their activities. 76 
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In 2005, The Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding 
the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, reaffirms the UN Charter’s 
principles, particularly people’s right to self-determination.  This document states further 
that the international community is “alarmed and concerned” about mercenary activities, 
predominantly in Africa.  Moreover it reiterates that the hiring or training of mercenaries 
“are causes for grave concern to all states and violate the purposes and principles 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations…”77 What is more, it recognizes that the 
current international climate of civil wars, covert operations and arms trafficking 
“encourage the demand for mercenaries on the global market.”78  This document 
concludes that for all of these reasons, the establishment of a Working Group that is 
dedicated to studying mercenaries is essential. As discussed in the next chapter, the 
Working Group annually releases reports calling for proposals concerning mercenaries.  
However it was not until 2010 that the Working Group compiles a more concerted and 
explicit report (discussed later). 
One convention that seventeen states, including the United States and the United 
Kingdom, have signed and many PMC affiliated groups have endorsed is the Montreux 
Document (September 2008).  This document is exceptional in that it characterizes the 
obligations of the home state, the territorial state, and the contracting state without 
attempting to define a mercenary.79  Uniquely, it explicitly lists in what manner each of 
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these states are answerable for the private military organizations.  In fact, the document 
suggests that collectively these states are absolutely responsible for these private firms.  
For instance, states are obligated to set legislation and regulations, as well as make sure 
that the PMCs are recognizing them and adjudicate any persons breaching human rights 
laws.80
Furthermore, the doctrine is distinctive because it is written in two parts.  The first 
half lists the general obligations of the states and the private military firms and the second 
lists “Good Practices” that all entities must follow.81  For example, when vetting a PMC, 
a contracting state must thoroughly investigate the firm: does the PMC screen its future 
employees (such as running a background check, including if they have ever been fired 
from another private security force), to see if the contractors are sufficiently trained, and 
inquire as to the firm’s practices concerning force and fire arms.82  The home states, for 
instance, would also oversee the above regulations including meticulously investigating a 
security company.  Moreover, the home states would enforce the public disclosure of 
PMCs and impose sanctions on the businesses that are negligent in respecting the policy.  
For example, in the United States, information about private military organizations is 
currently not available via the Freedom of Information Act.   To many, this is the key to 
regulating these businesses: 
The firms must realize that they have to be open to a higher 
degree of scrutiny, including full disclosure of equity 
partners and client lists. Their current lack of full 
transparency has backfired, as it feeds concerns about 
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firms’ ulterior motives and certainly bars any realization of 
full legitimacy.83
The main obstacle to regulating the PMCs is the lack of conventions that clearly, 
but possibly separately, characterizes a mercenary from a PMC contractor.  The 
classification needs to be recognized by all countries as well as their resident military 
contracting businesses and there should be a parallel organ capable of monitoring the 
military corporations.  To further complicate the matter of fleshing out such regulations, 
employing PMCs may provoke concerns about state sovereignty and non- state actors. 
Left unaddressed, involvement of a private military firm can result in the further 
weakening of a tenuous state. 
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Chapter 6 
Toward Stronger Regulations of PMCs 
There are a number of potential ways to ensure the supervision of the private 
military companies (PMCs).  As already discussed, one such way is through the legal 
conduits of the United States courts.  This can be beneficial but as mentioned, an Alien 
Tort Statute (ATS) claim can be a very lengthy process, and thus, expensive.  
Nonetheless, an ATS civil lawsuit can reap enormous monetary rewards.  Other solutions 
are to persuade other nations to cultivate efficient judicial systems and strengthen their 
regional human rights laws.  It is paramount for a state to be capable of resolving its own 
tribulations.  In order for regulations on PMCs to be passed internationally, if possible the 
laws should derive from the states, from the inside out, thus creating international norms.  
This is also the only manner in which PMC regulations will work legally and financially. 
According to one report, “The development of effective domestic legal systems is critical 
to creating a global human rights regime that not only provides effective redress to 
victims, but also instills the necessary conditions for social stability and peace within 
developing countries.”1  The strengthening of a nation’s domestic human rights laws 
would spill over, refining a global judiciary system.   However, this would be very 
difficult.   As mentioned previously, many nations would have to alter their cultures, as 
well as their legal systems. 
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Many envision a world civil court like an expanded International Criminal Court 
(ICC).  If victims can not seek retribution in their own nations, then an international court 
would be a preeminent solution.  A world tort judicial system would then promote an 
earnest development of international law.  Critics may point out that, “[a]llowing victims 
to bring claims against their governments in a foreign or international [venue] in the first 
instance may prevent countries transitioning from violence to peace from developing the 
machinery necessary to become effective protectors of individual rights.”2  Some propose 
extending the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) jurisdiction to include individuals: 
One of the main arguments relates to the modest number of 
cases States have been willing to take to the Court, 
compared to the wide range of important legal issues that 
would merit its attention. [A]mending the ICJ Statute to the 
effect that the Court could be petitioned by any person, 
non-governmental organization or group of individuals 
claiming to be a victim of a violation of international law 
by a [s]tate or an international organization, provided that 
the [s]tate has accepted, or that the international 
organization has been made subject to, such a 
jurisdiction… 
[It has also been] argued for the creation of a World Human 
Rights Court that would have binding jurisdiction over 
[s]tates, international organizations, transnational 
corporations and other actors that have recognized the 
binding jurisdiction of that court to deal with claims by 
individuals and others about human rights violations.3  
However, this would require more money from the member states of the United Nations 
(UN).  Many are currently delinquent on their dues. 
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The Montruex Document elevated the definition of mercenary to include PMCs.  
Additionally, the document attempted to specify all of the circumstances that may 
involve a PMC. As mentioned in the previous chapter, it also distinguished between the 
various parties such as the home, contracting and client state.  In Amnesty International’s 
critique of the Montreux Document, the group commends the authors’ efforts and 
attempts to be specific.  Nevertheless, Amnesty Intentional comments that the work fails 
to discuss applicable international laws.  They posit also that some responsibilities 
between the states are duplicative or similar and it is not clear what state should respond 
or be held accountable if a problem arises.  Additionally: 
[t]he document might also have better reflected a key signal 
development, directly relevant to companies, namely the 
consensus adoption by the UN Human Rights Council of 
resolution 8/7 in June 2008, endorsing the normative 
framework set forth by the UN Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General (SRSG) on the issue of Human 
Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business 
Enterprise. …This framework is based on three overarching 
principles: the [s]tate duty to protect all human rights from 
abuses by, or involving, transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises; the corporate responsibility to 
respect all human rights; and the need for access to 
effective remedies. The generic language of “duty to 
protect” and “responsibility to respect” does not appear in 
the Montreux Document, even though this construction 
constitutes the consensus formulation in relation to the 
standard governing business and human rights.4
One of the most prolific writers on the subject of PMCs, P.W. Singer, proposes a 
parallel solution involving both domestic and intercontinental organs and regulations.  He 
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argues that at the very least, states must be held responsible for their native private 
military firms or those that they employ, in conjunction with the accountability of the 
transnational community: 
Essential requirements include more transparent licensing 
processes, government oversight over local PM[Cs] 
contracts, and the establishment of financial and 
operational reporting requirements of the firms.  The 
business services provided by PM[Cs] are military in 
orientation, but also impact the realm of foreign policy.  
Over sight should thus be multi-agency, involving the 
Commerce, State, and Defense Departments, or their local 
equivalents, in order to ensure full coverage of the nuances 
of the issues… 
A body of international experts, with input from all 
stakeholders (governments, the academy, nongovernmental 
organizations, and the firms themselves), could establish 
the parameters of the issues, build an internationally 
recognized database of the firms in the industry, and lay out 
potential forms of regulation, evaluation tools, and codes of 
conduct. …This task force could ultimately become the 
core of a permanent international office designated to 
handle such issues on a normal basis… 
This would include subjecting PM[Cs] personnel databases 
to appraisal for past violations of human rights.  As a 
sanctioned business…this would allow PM[Cs] to gain 
contracts from [a range] of clients….thus, [they] will be 
motivated to support this system, in that it “clears” them for 
business. …5
In the past few years, the Working Group has made many recommendations to the 
global community about the private military security industry.  For example, in Mission 
to Chile (2008), the Working Group recommended that nations extend the career of a 
solider to dissuade the enlistment of military personnel as one potential solution to the 
                                                 
5 P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors, The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, (Cornell 
University Press: New York 2002), 240-241. 
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proliferation of PMCs.6 In 2010 they compiled a Report on the Use of Mercenaries as 
Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to 
Self- Determination.  The Working Group explains that they have been apprised of 
numerous situations in which citizens’ human rights have been violated by these private 
firms, and thus, it is imperative to close the existing gaps in the current regulations.  
Composed of people who have become experts on the private military industry, the 
Working Group recommends a two tier solution similar to Singer’s strategies.  Their 
proposal also involves both the domestic and global governmental bodies.  The Working 
Group strongly asserts that the state has an obligation to implement human rights laws, 
and therefore, states are further required to enact laws and policies concerning private 
military industry.  Furthermore, the Working Group advised that there should be a 
transnational body that closely monitors and maintains databases on the PMCs and their 
global dealings.  Concomitantly, the states will report to this organization regularly.  The 
Working Group also advises that a victim fund be established to compensate a party 
injured by private military personnel. 
Like the Montreux Document, the Working Group’s definition of a PMC and 
their contractors does not include the term mercenary because it is already defined in 
other conventions.  A PMC is defined as follows: 
Convention: 
(a) Private Military and/or Security Company (PMSC): refers to a 
corporate entity which provides on a compensatory basis military 
and/or security services by physical persons and/or legal entities; 
                                                 
6 Working Group, Mission to Chile, United Nations, A/HRC/7/7/Add.4, February 4, 
2008, 18, ¶80. 
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(b) Military services: refers to specialized services related to military 
actions including strategic planning, intelligence, investigation, 
land, sea or air reconnaissance, flight operations of any type, 
manned or unmanned, satellite surveillance, any kind of 
knowledge transfer with military applications, material and 
technical support to armed forces and other related activities; 
(c) Security services: refers to armed guarding or protection of 
buildings, installations, property and people, any kind of 
knowledge transfer with security and policing applications, 
development and implementation of informational security 
measures and other related activities. 7 
The Working Group reiterates security theory in that it specifically maintains that 
only a state may wage or participate in war. A state can not subcontract a private military 
force: 
Inherently State functions: are functions which are 
consistent with the principle of the [s]tate monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force and that a [s]tate cannot outsource or 
delegate to [PMCs] under any circumstances. Among such 
functions are direct participation in hostilities, waging war 
and/or combat operations, taking prisoners, lawmaking, 
espionage, intelligence, knowledge transfer with military, 
security and policing application, use of and other activities 
related to weapons of mass destruction and police powers, 
especially the powers of arrest or detention including the 
interrogation of detainees and other functions that a [s]tate 
party considers to be inherently [s]tate functions.8
This report is partially a compilation of past works, all of which involved many 
years of experience and hind sight that assisted in creating resolutions to tackle the role of 
private military businesses.  This document expands on all of the past works that 
attempted to define and regulate a private soldier. Borrowing from its immediate 
                                                 
7 United Nations, The Working Group, “The Report of the Working Group on the Use of 
Mercenaries as Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the 
Right of Peoples to Self- Determination,” A/HRC/15/25, July 2, 2010, Article 2, 24 
(emphasis omitted).  
8 Ibid., 25. 
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successor, the Montreux Document, the Working Group document expanded on the 
distinguishing between the home, contracting and territory states to further include the 
countries that permit their nationals to work for a foreign PMC.  PMCs’ mass recruiting 
from developing countries has become a common theme in the current theatres of war in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.9  This encompasses racist and classist policies including, but not 
limited to, paying those from developing countries considerably less than their 
counterparts from dominant nations.   Many of these contractors from developing nations 
signed contracts that overrode their government’s laws that protected them, as well as 
their rights to file claims against the PMC. 10  As Jeremy Scahill notes: 
While the Bush administration struggled and failed to build 
a “Coalition of the Willing” among nations for its invasion 
and occupation of Iraq, the private military firms 
Washington hired to support its Iraq operation recruited 
aggressively around the globe – often in nations whose 
military and security forces had horrible human rights 
records and reputations. …The workers from across the 
developing world [(]many of whose home countries 
strongly opposed the war [)] [were] hired by Halliburton, 
Bechtel, Flour and other “reconstruction” megafirms. 
…The United States may not have been able to convince 
many governments to deploy forces in Iraq, but it certainly 
could entice their citizens with promises of significantly 
higher wages than they could earn at home. 11
The Working Group endeavored, and may have succeeded, in dealing with most 
classifications or scenarios involving private military firms and states.   It is a vast work.  
                                                 
9 Approximately 40 percent of the contractors in Iraq are from developing countries. 
Kristen A. Huskey and Scott M. Sullivan, “The American Way: Private Military 
Contractors and U.S. War after 9/11,” The Priv-War Report, University of Texas Law 
School, April 30, 2009, 6. 
10 Working Group, Mission to Chile, 8-11. 
11 Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater, The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army 
(New York: Nation Books, 2007), 181-182. 
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Like any doctrine, it is only a work in progress.  It is not without criticism.  Its dissenters 
suggest that the document’s proposals need to be more specific.  Furthermore, they argue 
that the cost of all of its plans will be enormous to the state.   
Conclusion 
The Working Group’s report is thus far only a draft proposal.  Nevertheless, it is 
the most significant document to emerge from this sixty year debate of what is a 
mercenary and what are the legal constraints.  As noted above, it extracts and enhances 
the ideas of past works and creates new proposals about the private military industry.  If 
the policies of this draft were implemented, it would further unify and strengthen the 
domestic and intercontinental legal systems.  The Working Group’s proposal to hold 
domestic legal systems accountable for their national PMCs would in turn cultivate a 
strong transnational legal system.  One structure would reinforce the other. 
PMCs’ existence offers the global community many chances to address 
imperative issues such as state sovereignty, the state’s monopoly on security, the 
devaluing of institutions, the expansion of governmental branches, such as the executive 
power, the use of non-state actors to implement foreign policy and the further weakening 
of delicate nations in the throes of conflict. 
PMCs are currently used as a foreign policy apparatus.  In the post 9/11 United 
States, the “fight against terrorism” has tacitly allowed the chipping away of citizens’ 
civil liberties as well as permitted the executive power to balloon.  As mentioned at the 
beginning of this thesis, the Obama administration has been involved in many 
clandestine, illegal activities in Yemen, North Africa and Pakistan using private 
90 
contractors. 12  On January 27, 2011 Raymond Davis, a private military freelancer 
working for the CIA, who used to be in United States special forces, killed two men in 
Pakistan.  It is unclear if Davis is a diplomat or a PMC.  The United States claims he 
worked as a diplomat and therefore declared diplomatic immunity for his crimes.  Some 
news articles maintain that Davis used to work for Blackwater, while another source says 
that he was contracted by the PMC Hyperion LLC.13  Nonetheless, the deceased families 
were paid-off to the tune of $2.3 million dollars.  In one phone call, Davis was 
“removed” from the situation by the United States’ Consulate in Pakistan.14  Using PMCs 
in this covert manner, expands the executive branch, is a breach of another nation’s 
sovereignty and as such, could ignite a potentially volatile conflict the between states. 
Additionally, as we have seen in Angola, Sierra Leone, and perhaps Iraq, a PMC 
can expand a conflict, further weakening collapsed states.  PMCs have been accused of 
not only causing more violence but financially ruining some countries.  Some opponents 
even insist that it is in the PMC’s interest to create and maintain chaos so that their 
businesses remain profitable.  For instance is the recent (2011) civil conflict that has 
arisen in Libya where citizens have attempted to remove Moammar Qadhafi.  In the first 
days of the revolt, the Qadhafi government hired private military soldiers to buttress the 
                                                 
12 See Ftnts 12 and 13 in Chapter 3. 
13 Lauren Frayer, “Accused Killer Raymond Davis was CIA Spy in Pakistan,” 
http://www.aolnews.com/2011/02/21/accused-killer-raymond-davis-us-diplomat-in-
pakistan-or-cia-spy/, February 21, 2011. 
14 Chris Arsenault, “Spy Game: The CIA, Pakistan and ‘Blood Money,’” AlJazeera 
http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/03/2011317131348571552.html#. 
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remaining army.  These soldiers, most from Africa, 15  have reportedly killed thousands 
of Libyan civilians, including doctors to prevent them from treating the wounded 
victims.16
The United Nations and the domestic governments must address discontented 
non-state actors, such as terrorists and “legitimate” non-state actors, such as PMCs.17  
The international body has to begin revising applicable conventions to include 
individuals, not just nations accused, of committing egregious acts or breaching 
conventions.  At the domestic level, states need to supplement and reinforce the 
international efforts to curb non-state actor violence too.  Non-state actors are the cause 
of many international violations of human rights laws and United Nations’ conventions. 
“[N]on-state actors are often most responsible for human rights violations and …the 
governmentcentric view [is] inadequate in dealing with these violations.” 18 The modern 
day non-state actors can also be very sophisticated, and they can procure the most 
advanced equipment, such as weapons or various electronic devices.   
PMCs are most likely here to stay, therefore, as “legitimate” non-state actors, 
their role, particularly during conflicts, must be addressed and defined.  
As long as war exists, so will a demand for military 
expertise.  PM[Cs] will resultantly benefit from any slack 
                                                 
15 Petra Cahill, “How Gadhafi Could Find Mercenaries,” 
http://worldblog.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/02/25/6132143-how-gadhafi-could-find-
mercenaries, February 25, 2011. 
16 Democracy Now, http://www.democracynow.org/, February 22, 2011. 
17 As stated in chapter 1, for the purposes of this paper, “non-state actors” does not refer 
to non-violent groups such as NGOs. 
18 Jill Greenfield, “The Future of Alien Tort Statute Litigation: A Talk by Paul Hoffman,” 
Harvard Law School, March 11, 2011, 1. 
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given by traditional sources of security.  The overall history 
of public military actors indicates that the privatized 
military industry will continue to play a significant and 
increasing role in international security in the next decades.  
Moreover, it will likely do so for all measures of clients.  
The simple reason is that the very same structural 
conditions that led to the industry’s growth still appear to 
be in place.  Few dampening forces loom, while pressures 
for further expansion remain on the rise.  As one recent 
conference report noted, “The supply of private security 
forces and the demand for them are growing by leaps and 
bounds…”19
Continued changes in the nature of war and the realm of 
privatization will also play a role in sustaining the 
industry’s health.  The growing effects of technology in the 
revolution in military affairs only reinforce private firms’ 
critical importance to high-level military functions and 
expose states’ inability to supply such activities on their 
own.  Likewise, continued reductions and restrictions in 
force structure “make using a logistic-support contractor 
like [Kellogg] Brown & Root almost mandatory.”20
Therefore, since the PMCs will continue to be hired by many entities (particularly the 
United Nations and various states), laws and regulations concerning them must be passed.   
However, this must be accomplished internationally as well as locally.  In order for it to 
succeed, the regulation of the PMCs should be initiated concurrently at each 
governmental tier.  The only doctrine that addresses the joint legislative effort of the 
global and domestic communities (in addition to other specific proposals mentioned 
above) is the Working Group’s draft The Report of the Working Group on the Use of 
Mercenaries as Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right 
                                                 
19 Singer, 230 (quoting “Are Private Security Forces Sometimes Preferable to National 
Military Forces?” Conference Notes, Fiftieth Anniversary Symposium of the Moore 
Society on International Law, University of Virginia, February 24, 2001). 
20 Ibid., 231 (quoting Donald T. Wynn, “Managing the Logistics-Support Contract in the 
Balkan Theater,”Engineer (July 2000), http://findarticles.com/p/ articles/mi_m0FDF/is 
_3_30/ai_65350720/). 
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of Peoples to Self- Determination.  As mentioned, this document’s detractors argue that it 
will be very expensive to fulfill its requirements.  Some of the financial burden can be 
decreased by PMCs paying mandatory annual dues to the United Nations or through 
coalition groups such as the International Stability Operations Associations (ISOA) or 
British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC).  These military firms are 
extremely affluent and many are also subsidiaries of wealthy Multinational Corporations 
(MNCs).  In addition, as businesses, they are administered many tax breaks.  Tim Spicer, 
the owner of Aegis, who has had a lengthy career peppered with accusations of human 
rights violations said: 
Given that a PMC is a business, it is acknowledged that a 
fundamental law of successful business is that the supplier 
is only as good as his last contract.  Ethical businesses first 
build a reputation and then work hard to protect it.  If a 
particular PMC performed badly or unethically, exploited 
the trust placed in it by a client, changed sides, violated 
human rights or sought to mount a coup, then this company 
and its principals would find that their forward order book 
was decidedly thin. Discarding ethical and moral principles 
can therefore only be a one time opportunity.  The chance 
will not recur and the company’s prospects would 
disappear.21
The concept of a company not living up to its legal responsibilities and thus losing 
business, would be ideal, however this is not reality.  The reality is that PMCs may be 
hired for many reasons (legitimate or otherwise) but if necessary, they can do some dirty 
work, such may have been the case involving Raymond Davis, in which there were few 
political ramifications for the governments because they could than plead ignorance.  The 
armed forces are given the trust and responsibility to protect their citizens, while 
                                                 
21 Andrew Clapham, “Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict 
Situations,” International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 88, No. 863, September 2006, 
517. 
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concurrently being given weapons. But they also have rules that they must follow.  The 
same concept must be applied to military firms because they also are entrusted to 
sometimes protect citizens or be near them in conflict zones.  Additionally, many of the 
contractors do carry weapons. 
Many states are utilizing these firms to implement their countries’ foreign 
policies.  If human rights violations are committed by a PMC, then conflicts between 
countries can arise.  For example, at the time of writing this thesis, many in Pakistan are 
demanding justice over the incident involving the quasi CIA agent/ contractor Raymond 
Davis.22  In another event, an American contractor, Allan Gross, was found guilty of 
“crimes against the state” by a United States’ enemy, Cuba, where he will serve 15 years 
in prison. 23 Incidents such as these could have had serious repercussions for states 
including communication breakdowns, trade embargoes and even war. 
To sum up, the best solution would be the passing of the Working Groups’ 
recommendations.  This would be difficult because primarily countries would need to 
establish domestic legislation and departments.  Establishing regulations internationally 
would be less arduous but it would involve the ratification of the Working Groups’ 
Report first.  After which, instituting the departments for implementing the international 
regulations would not be laborious.  Besides the task of achieving unanimous votes 
domestically and internationally, the major impediment is money.  Many countries, 
particularly where PMCs are hired, do not have much money. Therefore it must be 
                                                 
22 Arsenault, 
http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/03/2011317131348571552.html#. 
23 Paul Haven, “Cuba finds American Guilty of Crimes Against the State,” 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42048959/ns/world_news-americas, March 12, 2011. 
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accomplished by having the PMCs pay yearly membership dues to help establish these 
regulations domestically in the poorer countries and internationally. 
The other solution might be to retain the definitions of a PMC in the Montreux 
Document and the Working Groups’ Report while concurrently pressuring the “home” 
states to institute domestic regulations on the PMCs (especially concerning background 
checks, diagnosing and treating Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, arms control and public 
disclosure).  For the most part, PMCs are based in the wealthier countries where there 
should not be many obstructions.  Additionally, the UN probably could afford to monitor 
the private military firms on a minimal level.  Both the ISOA and the BAPSC could 
promote the rules mentioned above.  As Tim Spicer alluded to, in order for a PMC to 
continue to profit, it should want to encourage regulations on the industry.  Moreover, if 
MNCs and Non-Governmental Organizations are sometimes the clients of these private 
security businesses, they also should insist that laws be approved.  For example, 
insurance companies and the military industrial complex make large sums of money on 
this modern day gold rush.  If they want to continue reaping the financial rewards of the 
PMCs, then they should insist that the contracting security businesses be more regulated. 
If no new laws or regulations concerning the private military industry are ratified, 
then at least in the United States court system, victims of human rights violations can 
possibly find relief by claiming the Alien Torts Statute.  
[T]hese cases stand for the proposition of corporate 
accountability in ways that almost nothing else out there 
does now, at least symbolically.  It’s one of the few places 
we can bring corporations to account for these kind of 
violations.  Recognizing the limits of the [United States’] 
lawyers bringing suit against [United States] corporations 
in district courts, [the] ultimate goal is to inspire 
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international regulation of corporate conduct in order to 
enforce good corporate behavior. 24
However, just recently in Kiobel, the Second Circuit decided against a hearing en banc on 
its earlier decision where it ruled that corporations can not be held liable under ATS 
claims (over turning many of its own verdicts).  The Kiobel case may be heard in the 
Supreme Court.  If at the Supreme Court level the judges affirm the 2d Circuit’s decision, 
this will destroy ATS litigation seeking to find MNCs culpable of human rights 
violations.  If Kiobel’s petition for writ of certoria is denied, then the 2d Circuit ruling 
will remain.  This is not auspicious either because the Supreme Court may use it to judge 
another ATS case in the future.  Additionally, the 2d Circuit is one of more important 
courts when reviewing ATS cases.  Therefore, this circuit’s “controlling law” unless 
overturned, is Kiobel. 
Hate them or love them, the debate over PMCs will force governments and the 
transnational community to tackle various issues such as the roles of non-state actors, 
state sovereignty, security, the expansion of certain branches of government, covert 
activity, the potential for weakening institutions such as the armed forces, and the further 
weakening of other countries’ institutions and collapsed states.  Additionally, as we have 
seen, the old ways of making war have changed, which means the rules and regulations 
need revisions as well.  
                                                 
24 Greenfield, 2. 
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